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Bob Cover often returned to the moral complexity of rules, his magnifi-
cent obsession. In Justice Accused,' for example, Bob brought extraordi-
nary historical knowledge and insight to his study of judges who person-
ally abhorred slavery but who nevertheless upheld the law and returned
fugitive slaves to their masters. It is a book that teaches beautifully and
rewards each rereading.
In his everyday life, Bob's words and deeds connected almost seamlessly
with his published scholarship. He could both provoke and inspire. In
numerous ways beyond the classroom, Bob taught about complicity, but
never through professorial pomposity. He did not oversimplify the com-
plex, nor did he suggest unquestioning leaps of faith or despair. Instead,
Bob wrestled aloud with the profound issues of how law, and narratives
about law, may be challenged and changed. He illuminated ways to think,
not what to think. Instead of claiming certainty or pretending to a defini-
tive understanding of the boundaries marking the jurisdiction of justice,
Bob Cover passionately confronted our deepest moral and legal dilemmas.
His struggle was to create more perfect justice instead of a better hierar-
chy of rules.
I begin this article in memory of my friend with a discussion of the pre-
Civil War slavery decision in Betty's Case.2 Exploring the haunting moral
complexity of that decision, which allowed a former slave to choose to
t Professor of Law, Boston University. I continue to be very lucky in the friends I have and the
help they provide. There are many who deserve credit or blame, but I would particularly like to
acknowledge Kathryn Abrams, Milner Ball, Dennis Curtis, Haggai Hurvitz, John Leubsdorf, Bruce
Mann, Martha Minow, Mark Pettit, Judith Resnik, David Seipp, Carol Weisbrod, Stephen Wizner,
and Larry Yackle for aiding and abetting my struggles with this material over the years. I also
benefitted from comments made by Kermit Hall, William Wiecek, and those in the audience when I
presented a section of this article at the 1981 annual meeting of the Organization of American
Historians.
This article is a piece of a larger study of the Thirteenth Amendment, made possible in part by
grants from Project '87 and the American Bar Foundation and by summer research opportunities
provided by Boston University and the University of Wisconsin Legal History Workshop. A number
of research assistants have helped me on this project including, in particular, William Abrams, Lance
Cassak, Lisamichelle Davis, Margaret Geary, Jamie Newman, and Edward Reeves; Ken Westhassel
has tried valiantly throughout to get things organized and to type my scrawls.
1. R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975) [hereinafter JUSTICE ACCUSED].
2. 20 Monthly L. Rep. 455 (Mass. Nov. 9, 1857). The decision was not officially reported. I have
relied on this unofficial report and contemporary newspaper accounts. I first learned of Betty's Case in
two footnotes in L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 68 n.19,
69 n.21 (1957) [hereinafter THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH].
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return to slavery, provides a particularly appropriate way to think about
Bob Cover and his work.
In other words, Betty's Case is the kind of case within Bob Cover's
unique jurisdiction. With his attention to the possibilities of "sacred nar-
ratives of jurisdiction" and to the dangers of complicity,3 Bob could have
done it justice. Bob's published work and the way he lived offered lumi-
nous treatment of sobering and often reprehensible aspects of legal history.
Yet Bob kept faith and inspired creation of new constitutional worlds
through the redemptive power of better narratives. We will be learning
from the stories Bob Cover told, and from our stories about Bob, for years
to come. Thinking about the bizarre meeting of a young slave known only
as Betty and the renowned Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw may help us
grieve, celebrate, and remember together.
I. "A COLORED WOMAN, CALLED BETTY"
A. Prelude: The Legal Setting
The nation knew Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts largely for his slavery decisions." In the 1830's,
Commonwealth v. Ayes5 gave hope to antislavery advocates. In Ayes,
Shaw adapted Lord Mansfield's famous holding in Somerset's Case' for
3. Bob explored the nexus between narrative and nomos throughout his work. See JUsTICE Ac-
CUSED, supra note 1, at 123-30 (discussing complicity and comparing rules and possible changes in
rules of games, language, and law); Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP.
U.L. REV. 179, 183 (1985) [hereinafter Cover, Folktales of Justice] (discussing "sacred narratives of
jurisdiction"); Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative] (issue of complicity developed at
length).
4. Shaw may well have been the most influential judge in the nation during the thirty years from
1830 through 1860, when he presided over the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. This was a
time when state courts were pre-eminent and Massachusetts law and lawyers enjoyed considerable
renown. A well-known witticism about Shaw is attributed to Rufus Choate: "I always approach
Judge Shaw as a savage approaches his fetish, knowing that he is ugly, but feeling that he is great."
V.W. BROOKS, THE FLOWERING OF NEW ENGLAND, 1815-1865, at 325 (1936). Nevertheless, slav-
ery was an issue that commanded public attention, and Shaw handed down more than his share of
famous decisions involving slaves. For a fine discussion of Shaw and many of his decisions, see THE
LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 2.
5. 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836); see THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 2, at
62-71; see also JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 1, at 250 (Ayes and similar decisions ensured that
"Shaw's antislavery reputation was as widespread and secure as that of any judicial figure before
1850").
6. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772) (appearing originally in the colonies in 1
Lofft's Rep. 1 (1772)). Scholars have argued at length about what Lord Mansfield actually may have
said in Somerset's Case, but they generally agree that the report that reached the American colonies
contained Mansfield's label of slavery as so odious as to be permissible only when it was a creature of
positive law. The traditional paraphrase of Mansfield's decision was that the air of England was too
pure to be breathed by a slave, and that therefore a slave voluntarily brought to England from Vir-
ginia by his master immediately became free. See, e.g., D. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN
THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-1823, at 469-522 (1975). See generally W. WsscFn, THE SOURCES
OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1769-1848, at 20-61 (1977) (describing ambig-
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Massachusetts and for the new federal system. Shaw sought to put his
great stature behind a solution to a perplexing conflict of laws problem,
an abiding legal complication of divided sovereignty, exacerbated by the
complexities of an American nation half-slave and half-free.7 Shaw held
that, in the absence of positive law commanding slavery, natural law
(which embodied a basic legal presumption in favor of liberty) immedi-
ately and entirely freed a slave brought into Massachusetts voluntarily by
her master. Liberty was general, slavery only a product of local law.8
Thus, when Mrs. Slater of New Orleans brought along her six-year-old
slavegirl Med on her summer vacation in Massachusetts, Shaw ruled that
the girl immediately became free.'
The law was entirely different for fugitive slaves. Since federal constitu-
tional and statutory law protected slaveholders' property rights, fugitive
slaves did not become free upon entering Massachusetts. Shaw maintained
that the highest positive law in the country, the federal Constitution, was
premised on assurances to the South that runaway slaves would be re-
turned. 0 On several occasions, however, crowds of antislavery activists
uous nature of Somerset and its reception in America). For an enthusiastic account of the decision, see
A.L. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE & THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE
COLONIAL PERIOD 333-55 (1978), and for an intriguing use of the case as part of materials for the
study of legal process, see H. HoRowITz & K. KARST, LAW, LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
(1969).
7. See generally P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAvERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY
(1981) (conflict of laws issues involving slaves tested interstate harmony severely); Soifer, Compromise
at the Boundaries of Bondage, 10 REV. AM. HIsT. 185 (1982) (comity not matter of rights but part
of larger constitutional debate). As Don Fehrenbacher demonstrated, the conflict of laws problem
readily blended into John C. Calhoun's argument for the exclusivity of federal protection for the
rights of property owners, a theme played out tragically first in the Supreme Court and then on the
battlefields. D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS 139-41 (1978).
8. In this respect, Levy argues, "Shaw's was a diplomatic performance. He managed to voice
northern opinion resolutely, but without rebuke to the South." THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH,
supra note 2, at 64. As Cover emphasized, Americans often looked to natural law to fill gaps in
positive law, gaps that appeared throughout the nation's multiform system of laws. JUSTICE AC-
CUSED, supra note 1, at 17-19. Nonetheless, decisions such as Ayes seemed to articulate "a trouble-
some moral gap" and became important more for emphasizing the distance between morality and law
than for what they actually declared local law to be. Id. at 17. Shaw left the actual basis of his
decision in Ayes somewhat obscure, but in a subsequent decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court took
pains to disassociate itself from what the New Jersey judges regarded as the well-known antislavery
views of Lemuel Shaw. See id. at 57-58 (citing State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368 (1845)).
9. The Ayes case took its name from Mrs. Slater's father, Thomas Ayes, in whose custody Med
was kept. Read narrowly, Shaw's opinion in Ayes actually assumed that slavery and even the slave
trade did not violate international law, and merely freed Med on a technical application of rarefied
doctrines of conflict of laws and comity. Read broadly, Shaw went to considerable lengths to state that
slavery is "contrary to natural right" and entirely dependent on local law. Ayes, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.)
at 217.
10. This view-that an essential constitutional compromise assured northern noninterference with
the South's "peculiar institution"-is generally associated with the increased sectional stiife of the
1830's, and with decisions such as Aves, which may have heightened southern perceptions of isolation
and adverse moral judgments of the southern way of life. Nonetheless, one discovers similar argu-
ments decades earlier, before slavery became a heated political issue. For example, James Madison
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confronted Shaw in his own courtroom and successfully interposed their
own, very different ideas about what law or morality might require of
Massachusetts citizens faced with the plight of black persons alleged to be
fugitive property. For example, a large crowd supported the rescue of a
fugitive slave named Shadrach by a number of free blacks of Boston in
February, 1851. Although Shaw personally tried to bar the door, the res-
cuers carried Shadrach from the courthouse and "went off toward Cam-
bridge, like a black squall, the crowd driving along with them and cheer-
ing as they went."11
It was a remarkable moment two months later, therefore, when Shaw
again defied an antislavery mob and stooped under a chain surrounding
his courthouse in order to do what he saw as his constitutional duty: or-
dering the return of a fugitive slave to the South. 2 To leading Boston
merchants and their political allies, this dramatic scene represented obedi-
ence to law. The moment symbolized hope for the survival of the Union.
In contrast, leaders of Boston's legal and literary communities unmerci-
fully vilified Shaw, whom they viewed as an accessory to a legal kidnap-
ping. Shaw insisted that his decision was compelled by law; he also re-
garded it as essential to demonstrate that even Massachusetts would honor
the original constitutional compromise that was crucial to survival of the
Union, and would keep its part of the bargain that produced the great
statutory compromise of 1850.13
For many in Boston who vigorously opposed slavery, the spectacle of
argued during the Virginia Ratification debate that slaveholders should adopt the federal Constitution
because it would increase their control over runaway slaves. Madison argued that, in contrast, under
the Articles of Confederation "the states are uncharitable to one another" when a slave "elopes" from
a slave to a free state. JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 1, at 88 (quoting 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 453 (2d ed. 1836)); THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 337 (U. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961) (slaves are "considered by our laws, in some respects as persons, and in other
respects as property"). Pennsylvania passed special legislation to assure delegates to the 1787 Conven-
tion that they could bring slaves with them without fear of losing them due to their presence in a free
state. Cf. Selectmen of Windsor v. Jacob, 2 Tyl. 192, 200 (Vt. 1802) (excluding bill of sale as evidence
in suit seeking repayment from slaveowner of funds spent to support former slave, with dictum about
Vermont submitting "with cheerfulness to the national constitution" despite contrary views on
slavery).
11. S. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW,
1850-1860, at 149 (1968) (quoting C. ADAMS, RICHARD HENRY DANA, A BIOGRAPHY 182-83 (rev.
ed. 1891)).
12. THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 2, at 72-108.
13. Levy, Sim's Case: The Fugitive Slave Law in Boston in 1851, in L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS:
ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 290-92 (1972) (detailing volatile atmosphere in
Boston, including mass meetings, rescue plot, and "treasonably violent" address by Wendell Phillips,
as well as calls by other members of Boston antislavery leadership to nullify Fugitive Slave Act of
1850). For an excellent, succinct discussion of the Compromise of 1850 and its aftermath, and the
rhetoric it helped to generate, see S. CAMPBELL, supra note 11. For a provocative discussion of some
of the best-known oratory on that most famous oratorical occasion, see R. FERGUSON, LAW AND
LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 232-40 (1984) (Daniel Webster "perfected the central image of
the law-abiding citizen" and thereby became primary target of younger northern intellectuals for "his
devotion to lower law" and his "legal crime").
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the great Shaw bowing beneath a chain before ascending the bench, there
to uphold the "covenant with death,"' 4 demonstrated that the shame of
slavery could never be isolated and that the Slave Power would never be
satisfied. The spiralling, passionate clash over basic moral issues grew
even more heated several years later when, less than two weeks after Pres-
ident Pierce signed the hated Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854,1' an abortive
attempt to rescue a fugitive slave named Arthur Burns left a jail guard
dead and Burns in chains. This time, it took a military escort of 2000 men
to march the black man through streets of Boston, a city shrouded in
mourning with flags flying at half-mast. 6
It is not difficult, therefore, to imagine the bitterness with which citi-
zens of Boston reacted to news of the decision in the Dred Scott case.'
7
Chief Justice Taney's view of federalism incorporated a belief that it was
constitutionally incorrect to treat a black person as a national citizen. Ta-
ney thus found it unnecessary for a slave state to accept a free state's
classification of a black as free if the black person returned to a slave
state. This view particularly galled legal sophisticates among the Boston
elite;. 8 and Abraham Lincoln attracted considerable support when he sug-
14. The quote is from William Lloyd Garrison's famous address on July 4, 1854, at
Framingham, Massachusetts, accompanying his public burning of the federal Constitution. P.
PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL
WAR ERA 3 (1975). Wendell Phillips apparently began to refer to the Constitution in the words of
Isaiah as a "covenant with death and an agreement with hell" a decade before Garrison's dramatic
speech. See C. MARTYN, WENDELL PHILLIPS: THE AGITATOR 166 (1890).
15. Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277, 277-90 (1854). For a discussion of the Act, see D.
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 7, at 181-87.
16. S. CAMPBELL, supra note 11, at 124-32; THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 2,
at 105-06. It proved imposssible to obtain a guilty verdict from a Massachusetts jury in subsequent
prosecutions of the would-be rescuers of fugitive slaves. See L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 312 n.48.
17. D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 7, at 417-48. I have done my own brief survey of some of the
press reaction in the months after Dred Scott was handed down in March 1857. To term the response
vitriolic and impassioned understates the case. See, e.g., N.Y. Evening Post, reprinted in 27 THE
LIBERATOR, Mar. 20, 1857, at 45, col. 4, ("Are we to accept, without question, these new readings of
the Constitution-to sit down contentedly under this disgrace . . . to consent that hereafter it shall be
the slaveholder's instead of the freeman's Constitution? Never! Never!"); N.Y. Tribune, reprinted in
27 THE LIBERATOR, Mar. 20, 1857, at 45, col. 5 (denouncing Dred Scott as "wicked and false
judgment" that makes the Constitution "a bulwark of inhumanity and oppression"); The Commercial
Advertiser, reprinted in 27 THE LIBERATOR, Mar. 20, 1857, at 45, col. 6 (Dred Scott is "monstrous
usurpation").
18. It is not necessary here to enter the scholarly debate about the relative importance of slavery
generally, or the Dred Scott decision specifically, to the coming of the Civil War. It is sufficient to
note that even in Massachusetts the status of a slave as a person or as property was contingent, as a
matter of law, on the circumstances of the slave's entry into the state. Radically different procedures
followed from the initial presumption as to whether a black person was free or a slave. Moreover,
Dred Scott seemed to say that Massachusetts courts could no longer decide whether the property
rights of slaveholders commanded legal protection. The Dred Scott decision achieved an unusual level
of notoriety. In a period before mass print culture and long before modem mass media, courts, law-
yers, and legal decisions provided an important form of entertainment. See, e.g., R. ISAAC, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA, 1740-1790, at 88-94 (1982).
For the general reaction to Dred Scott, see D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 7, at 417-48; see also
V.W. BROOKS, supra note 4 (describing strong antislavery views of Boston literary set). For fine
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gested that the Dred Scott ruling was good for that case and that case
only, and that it need not restrict other people in their political views and
actions.1 9 But what did Lemuel Shaw think?
B. Betty's Case
Eight months after Dred Scott, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw once again
faced a legal dispute about the return of a slave to the South.
1. The Interview
As was his custom,20 Shaw, who was born during the Revolutionary
War and was seventy-six years old in 1857, retired into a private room
with the party in question. Upon emerging, Shaw "caused the following
record to be made."2 He wanted to establish clearly how he proceeded,
his findings of the facts, and his legal decision. Shaw elected to write in
the first person, rather than in the traditional judicial third-person voice.
Shaw thereby appeared more directly responsible than judges usually do
recent treatments of antebellum New England legal culture, see K. Newmyer, Harvard Law School,
New England Legal Culture, and the Dialectic of Antebellum Jurisprudence (Apr. 2, 1987) (on file
with author); F. Konefsky, Legal Culture in Antebellum Boston (Oct. 1986) (on file with author).
19. See Speech by Abraham Lincoln at Chicago, Illinois (July 10, 1858), reprinted in 2 A. LiN-
coL, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 385, 396 (R. Basler ed. 1946), and quoted
in Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 3, at 53 n.146 (explaining position of "refusing to obey
[Dred Scott] as a political rule").
20. Shaw had conducted private interviews of slaves-presumed free because they were volunta-
rily brought into Massachusetts-beginning in 1832, when he accepted the wish of Francisco, a boy
"12 or 14 years of age," to return as a slave to Cuba with his mistress, Mrs. Howard. Commonwealth
v. Howard, Daily Atlas, Boston, Dec. 5, 1832, described in THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH,
supra note 2, at 61-62. After interviewing an eight-year-old, however, Shaw determined that because
"a child of such tender years has no will, no power of judging ... his will and choice are to be
wholly disregarded." Commonwealth v. Taylor, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 72 (1841), quoted in THE LAW
OF THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 2, at 69. Levy says of the set of cases from Francisco's return
to slavery in 1832 through Shaw's decision to free a slave named Lucas brought into Boston harbor
aboard a United States Navy ship in 1844, "In none of these cases was the Chief Justice constrained
by statute or precedent to decide as he did: by his own opinions he made and defined the law." Id. at
71.
In continuing to make and define the law to include a private interview with Betty, Shaw may have
been inspired by the procedure adopted in other states, though not in Massachusetts, that required a
private interview by a judicial officer with a married woman before property she and her husband
owned could be conveyed to a buyer. See M. SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
EARLY AMERICA 14-40 (1986). Salmon writes that during the period she studied (1750-1830),
"Massachusetts lawmakers never gave formal recognition to the principle of coercion. Women did not
have private examinations, nor were they required to acknowledge deeds of conveyance in court." Id.
at 23. In this, as well as in a variety of other ways connected to resistance to equity courts, Salmon
concludes that the New England states were the least protective of the legal autonomy of women. Id.
at 185-93.
Therefore, while there were models in other jurisdictions for the private interview to protect a
married woman from coercion, Shaw was innovating in terms of Massachusetts law when he engaged
in such an equitable process in his inquiries into the free choices of slaves. His willingness to continue
to improvise in Betty's Case is made more dramatic by Dred Scott.
21. 20 Monthly L. Rep. 455, 456 (1857).
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for whatever pain his judicial power inflicted.22 Simultaneously, however,
by speaking in the first-person, Shaw shared his dilemma more immedi-
ately with the public and yet made his decision seem more compelled and
compelling.
Lewis and Laura Sweet came to Bostop from Lawrence in response to
a habeas corpus petition that female antislavery activists23 had filed to
challenge the Sweets' detention of "a colored woman, called Betty." He
continued, "I proposed and had an examination of the said Betty apart
from the said Sweet and wife, and all other persons."' 24 Even to try to
imagine this conversation challenges belief in the dialogic communitarian
possibilities of legal discourse so fashionable today.25 Yet Shaw had con-
ducted such interviews before and, at least on the surface, his opinion
betrays no uncertainty about the clarity of the messages exchanged.
2 6
22. In a curious way, Shaw was not retreating to formalism here. His opinion in Betty's Case,
unlike decisions by him and by the other antislavery judges Bob Cover discussed, did not respond to
the gap between personal morality and perceived legal duty by insistently ascribing responsibility
elsewhere. Bob Cover called particular attention to judicial rhetoric, and to its cognitive dissonance
function, as in the judicial "retreat to formalism," JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 1, at 195-267, but
Bob also understood that "[tihe judicial conscience is an artful dodger and rightfully so," id. at 201;
see also Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Role, 20
GA. L. REV. 815 (1986) (discussing pain and death inflicted by judges through actions of others);
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (describing legal interpretation as "form of
practical wisdom"); Cover, Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003 (1968) (discussing slavery and
Vietnam War draft resistance cases as instances of judicial enforcement of immoral laws). By using
the first-person in Betty's Case, Shaw departed from the norm. His approach is thus particularly
interesting in this case, although one newspaper described it as "a simple, limited case ... but so far
as it went, it reflected the highest credit upon our law, upon its officers, and upon the people." Boston
Journal, reprinted in 27 THE LIBERATOR, Nov. 20, 1857, at 186, col. 1.
23. The petition was made by "Lucy Schuyler, a widow, of Lawrence." Boston Herald, reprinted
in 27 THE LIBERATOR, Nov. 13, 1857, at 183, col. 1. The same report identifies "Mrs. Grover, wife
of Simon Grover, of Lawrence" as the party who arranged to bring the habeas petition. At one point,
Mrs. Grover "went upon her knees" to implore Betty to "decide to remain free and happy, instead of
going back to slavery." Id. Mrs. Grover also had a notably formal exchange with Mr. Lewis Sweet,
the slaveowner and the son of the Recorder of Nashville. Mr. Sweet was reported to be "not so
imposing, in appearance as his wife," but, after all, Mrs. Sweet was "one of the handsomest ladies
that ever honored the Court House with her presence" and "a perfect type of Southern women of
good breeding." Id. Mrs. Grover refused Sweet's offer to return a bonnet that Mr. Grover had given
to Betty when Mrs. Grover found "the poor thing with nothing but a plantation hat on." Id. Accord-
ing to Mrs. Grover, Betty called upon her and reiterated in front of a dozen ladies that Betty feared
that if she were carried back to Tennessee, her owner would die and she would be sold to strangers.
Id.
24. 20 Monthly L. Rep. at 456-57.
25. See, e.g., J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE
LAW 28-138, 238-40 (1985); J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS
AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 231-85 (1984); M. BALL,
LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY (1985); Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fic-
tions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871, 893-909 (1986).
26. The interview lasted "about ten minutes." Boston Herald, reprinted in 27 THE LIBERATOR,
Nov. 13, 1857, at 183, col. 1. The same report describes the presence of "a large crowd of colored and
white individuals," id., and "[a] considerable number of colored persons" continued to gather after
Shaw's decision. The Traveller, reprinted in 27 THE LIBERATOR, Nov. 13, 1857, at 183, col. 1
(1857). Burrill Smith, who had been a slave himself for 18 years, as well as Peter B. Brigham and an
unnamed "colored woman" continued to try to convince Betty to change her mind, though the Sweets
1922
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Shaw explained that he ordered a private examination "that there might
be no restraint or intimidation."2 He stressed that the full court previ-
ously approved this method. So Shaw and Betty conversed. Betty, as Shaw
saw it, was free to speak her mind.
"[I]t appeared to me," Shaw said of Betty, "that she is twenty-five
years old, intelligent and capable of judging for herself."2" He also found
"that she has a husband in Tennessee and other relatives; that she is
much attached to Mr. and Mrs. Sweet; is very well treated by them, and
desires to remain and return with them, and this desire she expressed
decisively and upon repeated inquiries."2" Because the Sweets had volun-
tarily brought Betty into Massachusetts, Shaw found the law to be clear:
Betty now was free. Because Betty was not a fugitive from labor in the
sense of the Constitution and the federal statute, the act of voluntarily
bringing her into Massachusetts became, according to Shaw, "in effect, an
emancipation."3 Shaw never mentioned that he was defying, or at the
very least ignoring, the holding in Dred Scott, though he clearly seemed to
do so by considering whether Betty was free, and by asserting the author-
ity of a Massachusetts court to be sufficient to deprive the Sweets of their
property.
31
were always present and the antislavery activists never got the twenty-four hours alone with Betty
that they desired. Id. The Traveller described an "absorbing," emotionally charged scene and notes
that Betty's master "concluded to remain in the Sheriff's office" until it was time to depart to Law-
rence. Id. This report concluded with John A. Andrew, lawyer for the antislavery activists and future
Governor of Massachusetts, addressing "the crowd of colored persons upon the outside, urging them
to comport themselves in such a manner as to bring credit upon themselves and the cause of freedom
which they so dearly loved." Id.
27. 20 Monthly L. Rep. at 455-56.
28. Id. at 457.
29. Id. Newspaper reports make it clear that Betty's "other relatives" included several children.
See The Slave Betty, Boston Courier, reprinted in 27 THE LIBERATOR, Dec. 11, 1857, at 197, col. 1.
Betty's plight touched off a bitter debate in the newspapers. The Boston Courier asked: "[H]ow do
these friends of Betty justify themselves for their persistaut [sic] attempts to break the marriage tie, to
persuade the wife to abandon her husband, and the mother to desert her children?" Id. This provided
a wonderful opening for "C.K.W."-probably Caroline K. Weston, who edited the antislavery Lib-
erty Bell with her sister, Maria Weston Chapman, see 6 THE LErERS OF WILLIAM LLOYD GARRI-
SON, 1868-1875, at 335 & n.1 (W. Merrill & L. Ruckames eds. 1981)-to emphasize that marriage
was not actually permitted to slaves and that husband, wife, and children were all entirely subject to
"some caprice in the head, or some deficiency in the purse" of their masters. 27 THE LIBERATOR,
Dec. 18, 1857, at 202, col. 6. Without directly condemning Betty, C.K.W. argued that if Betty had
accepted her freedom, she might have been able to rescue her family. Indeed, wrote C.K.W., "it is
even probable that she would have rescued one of these dear ones" and that, in any event, Betty's
plight would have awakened sympathy and interest and thereby served the cause of antislavery. Id.
30. 20 Monthly L. Rep. at 456.
31. "The rule was that slavery was local, and liberty general." Id. This portion of the report of
the case is written in the third-person. Shaw states "the rule" but then expresses only his "thought"
that his formal certification of Betty's freedom would "entitle her to her liberty in Tennessee." Id.
This part of the decision may be read as simply recognizing Dred Scott.
Shaw's uncertainty stems not only from Dred Scott, but also from the complicated conflict of laws
issue posed by the movement of slaves into freedom and back to slavery. Louisiana continued to honor
the older rule-which many Southern jurisdictions had followed before the debate over slavery ex-
ploded in the 1850's-that a slave, once freed, could return to a slave state and could later still invoke
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2. Betty's Free Choice
For Shaw, the decision in Betty's Case turned on what Betty freely de-
cided. According to Shaw, Betty was free and competent. Moreover, "it
was contrary to all the principles of freedom that this or any other person
should not exercise a free choice in such a matter."3 2 Rejecting Betty's
decision to remain a slave would have denied her freedom.
To Shaw, the very freedom guaranteed by Massachusetts-"her right
to freedom and protection here"-dictated that Betty was "at free liberty
to remain with Mr. and Mrs. Sweet, or go elsewhere, at her free
choice." 3 Freedom and protection, according to Shaw, were more than
merely consistent; the two concepts merged into a right. Massachusetts
would grant and protect freedom even for Betty, who was not yet a citizen
of Massachusetts and, under Dred Scott, could never be a citizen of the
United States." Indeed, Shaw warned those who might intervene that
they were "interdicted and forbidden to interfere with her personal liberty
in this respect."1
3 5
The long shadow of Dred Scott, however, reduced even a judge as
venerable as Lemuel Shaw to the mere hope that his decision in Betty's
Case might someday carry weight toward recognizing Betty's freedom.
Shaw insisted that his decision be formally recorded, "so that one, ten, or
twenty years hence, the party most interested might have the benefit of the
record."38 Yet regions of the country, political parties, localities, and even
the freedom established in another jurisdiction. Other Southern states repudiated that rule. See P.
FINKELMAN, supra note 7, at 187-235; Soifer, supra note 7, at 185.
Press commentaries on Betty's Case debated what, if anything, the decision-"coming from a Judge
recognized as one of the great luminaries of the bench, than whose name there is none brighter in our
judicial history"-said about Dred Scott, and whether there was any law in "Taney's law." New-
buryport Herald, reprinted in 27 THE LIBERATOR, Nov. 20, 1857, at 186, col. 2.
32. 20 Monthly L. Rep. at 456.
33. Id. at 457-58.
34. Although the meaning of the Dred Scott decision is unclear, Don Fehrenbacher's study clari-
fies the extent to which Chief Justice Taney's murky opinion represented the opinion of a majority of
the Court that federal constitutional protection of property followed the slave-holder. D.
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 7, at 333, 381-84. Taney, Fehrenbacher notes, stressed the issue of
domicile. Id. at 385-88, 396-98. A slave passing through Massachusetts, like Betty, could not be
considered domiciled in Massachusetts. Therefore, the rest of Taney's constitutional opinion governed
and protected the property rights of slaveholders like the Sweets.
35. 20 Monthly L. Rep. at 458.
36. Id. at 456. In certain respects, slaves fared well under Tennessee law as compared with the
law of other Southern states. Tennessee courts held that white slaveowners could be indicted and
convicted for "murder, mayhem, and manslaughter, committed upon the person of a slave" that they
themselves owned. See Worley v. State, 30 Tenn. (11 Hum.) 172, 176 (1850) (upholding conviction
for "mayhem" of slaveowner who had castrated an "unruly" slave). Courts also permitted manumis-
sion by will, even in cases where the testator had failed to meet statutory requirements. See, e.g.,
Laura Jane v. Hagen, 29 Tenn. (10 Hum.) 332 (1849) (allowing manumission despite testator's
failure to obtain "the assent of the state"); Lewis v. Daniel, 29 Tenn. (10 Hum.) 305 (1849) (al-
lowing manumission despite testator's failure to file petition in presence of requisite number of county
judges).
The liberality of Tennessee law had its limits, of course. Slaves continued to be bought and sold like
1924
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families soon bitterly split over which law would bind them. Heated con-
troversy about the extent of legitimate national authority over state, local,
and individual freedom hardened into irreconcilable differences, to be set-
tled at Gettysburg and Shiloh and Appomattox. As I will show below,
during the Civil War and even more in the years that followed, freedom
and protection no longer cohered into the single, unified right Shaw per-
ceived. Indeed, during Reconstruction and its aftermath, a right to free-
dom often stood in opposition to a right to protection.
In Betty's Case, the tension between individual autonomy and status is
clear. I venture to say that no one could easily resolve Betty's terrible
dilemma of a choice between family and freedom, the familiar and the
unknown. Moreover, a crucial additional factor seriously complicated both
the moral-formal dilemma faced 'by Shaw in his judicial role and the per-
plexing issues of complicity faced by the antislavery activists. Betty, the
would-be beneficiary of their moral judgments, might have been disabled
by their very efforts to protect her."7 Such additional complexity helps
chattels, see, e.g., Luna v. Edmiston, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 159, 160 (1857) (sale of "mulatto woman
...and her four children"); given as gifts, see, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Miller, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 472
(1858); or distributed by court order to satisfy the demands of creditors, see, e.g., Marley v. Cum-
mings, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 479 (1858). Manumitted slaves could be hired out to cover the cost of
shipping them out of the state, see, e.g., Boon v. Lancaster, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 577 (1854). One court
refused to permit a manumitted slave to settle in a county where her children-all slaves-resided
with their owners. See The Case of F. Gray, 28 Tenn. (9 Hum.) 513 (1848). The unemancipated
children of an emancipated slave could not inherit money or property bequeathed them by their fa-
ther. See Turner v. Fisher, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 209 (1856).
Particularly since Lincoln hoped to keep Tennessee in the Union by not interfering with slave
holders and since Tennessee was itself a battleground, see H. TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL REPUBLI-
CANS: LINCOLN'S VANGUARD FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 266-68 (1968), the Civil War years were an
especially complex and unsettling time for Tennessee slaves. See J. CIMPRICH, SLAVERY'S END IN
TENNESSEE 1861-1865, at 19-45 (1985).
I have not yet found out what happened to Betty, but it is possible to imagine that, back in Nash-
ville, she actually watched as Andrew Johnson, the military governor, took command of the city and
began to establish his national reputation as a loyal southern unionist. See generally P. MASLOWSKI,
TREASON MUST BE MADE ODIOUS: MILITARY OCCUPATION AND WARTIME RECONSTRUCTION IN
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, 1862-1865, at 20-32, 121-23 (1978). This led Johnson to the vice presi-
dency and put him on the path to vetoing the Freedmen's Bureau Bill and to clashing with Congress
over Reconstruction.
37. A.V. Dicey, the Vinerian Professor at Oxford, asserted that "protection invariably involves
disability." A. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW & PUBIC OPINION IN ENG-
LAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 150 n.1 (1905); see also Soifer, The Paradox of Pater-
nalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW &
HIST. REV. 249 (1987) (discussing Dicey's epigram and antipaternalistic pose of U.S. Supreme
Court).
Ironically, some of Shaw's most famous or infamous words concerned paternalism. They appeared
in his decision in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 210-11 (1849). In the course of
rejecting arguments by Charles Sumner and Robert Morris that the concept of equal protection re-
quired that the Boston schools be desegregated, Shaw wrote in terms of "paternal consideration" to
explain what equal protection entails:
But, when this great principle comes to be applied to the actual and various conditons of
persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion, that men and women are legally clothed
with the same civil and political powers, and that children and adults are legally to have the
same functions and be subject to the same treatment; but only that the rights of all, as they are
1925
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explain why the retreat into formalism beckons so seductively to all of
US.
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3. Respecting the Law
We are left with a large moral question: When is intervention beyond
the "measured forms" 9 of the law-even when those forms are employed
informally as in Betty's Case-warranted or even mandated? In Betty's
Case, no one interrupted a string of disquieting acts of collaboration with
the Slave Power performed by a young slave woman and a venerable old
man. No higher morality led to action by the antislavery mob or to op-
tions perceived beyond the slavery-freedom dichotomy.
Shaw transformed his interview with Betty into fact, then law, and then
into a fundamental principle of freedom. He declined to defy overtly, or
even to criticize, Dred Scott. But neither did Shaw suggest, for example,
that since Betty was and had been free for at least the six weeks she had
been in Massachusetts, she was owed wages and might continue to have a
right to be paid for her labor. 0 Shaw had once enjoyed a reputation as
settled and regulated by law, are equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protection
of the law for their maintenance and security.
This passage was quoted, probably with some sense of irony, as emanating from a state "where the
political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly endorsed," in Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
38. Bob Cover began Justice Accused with a quotation from Shalom Spiegel: "Justice cools the
fierce glow of moral passion by making it pass through reflection." JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 1,
at vii. Yet Bob focused throughout his work on the propensity of judges to hide their power behind
their rhetoric and to deny that they make moral choices when they do not heed moral claims. I want
to broaden Bob's point to suggest that most of us tend not merely to use, but also to seek comfort in
the clarity of rules. For, as a rule, "it is only the simple conceptions which take hold of a people's
mind," and a "false but clear and precise idea always has more power in the world than one which is
true but complex." A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 164 (J. Mayer ed. 1969).
39. This is the phrase Melville uses to describe Captain Vere's devotion to law. H. MELVILLE,
BILLY BUDD AND OTHER STORIES 380 (F. Bush ed. 1986) [hereinafter BILLY BUDD]. Bob Cover
introduced Justice Accused with a reflection on Vere's devotion to "forms, measured forms" and the
"symmetry of form attainable in pure fiction." JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 1, at 2-6. Billy Budd
can be considered a sustained inquiry about forms of many kinds and their abuses.
40. According to the report of Betty's Case, the Sweets' attorney stated that they "had been travel-
ling with their Servant Betty, in Canada and several of the Northern states, and for the last six weeks
had been at Lawrence." 20 Monthly L. Rep. at 455.
There were other realistic options available, however, obscured from view by the tendency of law-
yers and activists alike to reduce complex matters to binary choices. For example, accepted distinctions
within the law of persons in the 1850's allowed considerable movement away from the freedom/
slavery dichotomy. See, e.g., I. BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1974); Cottroll, Law, Politics and Race in Urban America: Towards a New
Synthesis, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 483 (1986). Justice Joseph Story repeatedly intervened to alter or
ignore contracts entered into by seamen because he considered them, as a class, to be vulnerable, "less-
than-equal partners to contracts." K. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 151
(1985). Similarly, judges frequently sought to protect married women, considered disabled as a matter
of common law, who were nonetheless thought to be clearly in need of equitable protection. Norma
Basch has demonstrated that Mary Beard overstated this phenomenon in M. BEARD, WOMAN AS A
FORCE IN HISTORY: A STUDY IN TRADrrIONS AND REALITIES (1946), but it remains an important
aspect of the antebellum legal landscape. N. BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE
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the nation's leading antislavery judge, but by the 1850's he had become
the bane of antislavery radicals-condemned as a Pontius Pilate guilty of
"unmanly submission" to immoral federal law.4
Yet the antislavery activists who gathered outside Shaw's chambers
when Shaw interviewed Betty chose not to intervene. They did nothing to
forestall Betty's re-enslavement once they had invoked the court's habeas
corpus jurisdiction. Betty was pitied, but to save her from herself would
be too paternalistic or too defiant. Though Betty's free will might have
been protected, The Liberator later pointed out that Betty's choice would
not preclude having her family sold away from her at any moment or
finding herself shipped to the auction block without regard to her
wishes.42 Since the nineteenth century was a time of tremendous personal
and economic uncertainty, even well-treated slaves often were sold when
AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 34-35 (1982). Moreover, the complicated
patterns in the legal treatment of free blacks, sailors, and women in the antebellum period illustrate
that reigning formal and practical legal categories permitted the severing of social, political, and civil
rights, as well as further subdivision. See J. KETINER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZEN-
SHIP, 1608-1870 (1978); Minow, 'Forming Underneath Everything That Grows': Toward a History
of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819, 857-84.
In Betty's Case, either Shaw or the antislavery activists also might have tried to raise the economic
stakes for the Sweets in a variety of ways, or to have undertaken efforts to purchase the freedom of
Betty's family. In the earlier fugitive slave case of Latimer, for example, the purchase of his freedom
resolved the controversy. THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 2, at 84. The subsequent
purchase of Frederick Douglass's freedom caused a split in abolitionist ranks. Ironically, William
Lloyd Garrison supported that purchase with a practical, ameliorist argument: "To save a fellow-
being, it is no crime sometimes to comply with even unjust demands." A. KRADITOR, MEANS AND
ENDS IN AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM: GARRISON AND HIS CRITICS ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS,
1834-1850, at 222 (1967).
41. JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 1, at 212, 250.
42. It is easy to overlook the point, but important not to lose sight of the terrible insecurity di-
rectly connected to the fact that slaves were property. In summarizing Thomas B. Chaplin's planta-
tion journal, Theodore Rosengarten puts it this way:
The lesson of Chaplin's journal, illustrated time after time, is that nothing but a white man's
conflicting claim could limit a master's property rights in a Negro-not the immunities given
to slaves by law, nor the sentiments of kind owners, nor the powers of independent black
institutions. Chief of all property rights was the right to transfer ownership-to sell, deed, or
bequeathe title in a Negro to another white person. Removal from one's relations and familiar
surroundings was a permanent prospect for every slave. A death or marriage in the master's
family, a foreclosure or court judgment for debt, an acquisition or disposal of land, was invari-
ably an event in the formation, erosion, or breakup of the black community. Whether the cause
brought joy or sorrow to the whites, its frequent consequence was a measure of pain to the
blacks. One did not have to be a troublemaker to face removal, which, among punishments
meted out to felons and chronic malcontents, was second in severity to death; one only had to
be a chattel owned by a mortal master.
T. ROSENGARTEN, TOMBEE: PORTRAIT OF A COTrON PLANTER 151-52 (1986). This uncertainty
led, in turn, to awful scenarios, such as one described by Rosengarten, when a court ordered that a
slave named John be sold to pay a debt. John was given "a ticket to go look for a master" and tried
desperately, but with little success, to get himself sold to a master who would treat him well. Id. at
195-96.
1927
The Yale Law Journal
their masters died or suffered financial setbacks.4 The antislavery activ-
ists condescended to Betty,44 but left her free to choose.
In essence, the abolitionists' restraint, Shaw's decision, and Betty's
choice shared a common feature: They all underscored the power of the
individualistic assumptions at the core of nineteenth-century law. The co-
nundrum of autonomy and paternalism confronted in this case raised the
issues at the core of Justice Accused. Moreover, this conundrum foreshad-
owed the dilemma of what to do with, to, or for the freedmen after the
Civil War. It is because the "fearful symmetries" '45 lined up so vividly in
Betty's Case that decisions to act or not to act in her case still strike us as
profoundly discomforting. Betty's Case also brings into focus the tension
between status and contract that helps to explain the failure of congres-
sional efforts to protect civil rights in the immediate postbellum period.
Betty's Case illustrates that freedom is a continuum rather than a bi-
nary choice. Betty had little room to maneuver along the continuum.
Shaw had many more options, ranging from delay, to equitable interven-
tions of various kinds, to public defiance of Dred Scott. The antislavery
activists also might have acted to prevent Betty's return to what they con-
sidered the lawless state of Tennessee. But Shaw invoked the principle of
freedom to exaggerate his constraints, and the complexity of the issue ren-
dered the antislavery mob immobile. They all decided not to intervene.
Inaction is also a moral choice. Moderation in confronting evil may be
"the invaluable understrapper of the wicked man" because "the moderate
man may be used for wrong, but [is] useless for right."4
Everyday intuitive notions of individual freedom inherent in contract
law were at once a crucial part of, and a hindrance to, significant congres-
sional efforts to undertake reform. The small Boston circle composed of
Shaw, Betty, and the antislavery petitioners before the Civil War, like
43. See L. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 47-50 (1985) (describing life in nineteenth century as "a
drama of tremendous uncertainty").
44. When Mrs. Grover's pleas to Betty were unavailing, according to the Herald, Mrs. Grover
declared that thereafter she would never interfere with slaves, as they did not possess "backbone
enough" to suit her. Boston Herald, reprinted in 27 THE LIBERATOR, Nov. 13, 1857, at 183, col. 1
(1857). The paper mentioned this comment by Mrs. Grover in the same sentence that reported that
Mrs. Grover's dress was damaged when the crowd rushed up the courthouse stairs after Betty. The
report may have been intended to deprecate the commitment of women to the antislavery cause,
though the importance and tenacity of that commitment is amply documented. See, e.g., A.
KRADITOR, supra note 40, at 39-77; R. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1837-1860 (1976).
45. JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 1, at 3. This is Bob Cover's term for Captain Vere's decision,
after Vere "really squirmed" to do the job of hanging Billy Budd. It may have been borrowed from
William Blake's poem, "The Tiger."
46. These are the words of "the Missourian" named Pitch in H. MELVILLE, THE CONFIDENCE-
MAN: HIS MASQUERADE 15 (H.B. Franklin ed. 1967). For an argument that Pitch symbolizes "the
central position that slavery occupies in Melville's indictment of America, and the pivotal role he
ascribes to it in determining the nation's future," see C. KARCHER, SHADOW OVER THE PROMISED
LAND: SLAVERY, RACE, AND VIOLENCE IN MELVILLE'S AMERICA 237-57 (1980).
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blacks, Radical Republicans, and most other Americans, believed deeply
in the right of individuals to make and enforce whatever contracts they
wished. Freedom of contract was a critical element in the prevailing defi-
nition of civil rights, yet judicial efforts to enforce the right to contract
formed a substantial barrier against protection of freedmen.
4. A Conundrum of Moral Complexity and Complicity: Status and
Contract
Legal, familial, and communal relationships suffuse decisions to act or
not to act. Yet we can see a mirror image of Shaw's decison in favor of
autonomy within Betty's own choice (at least if we credit Shaw's report).
Their decisions, together with the inaction by the antislavery activists, un-
derscore how manipulation of the concepts of status and contract could
entangle former slaves in a web stretching between fears of excessive pa-
ternalism and excessive autonomy. Abstract legal principles of contract
easily masked racism or indifference; failure to protect freedmen easily
could be defended as a decision not to intrude on their freedom.
I want to explore next how Betty's Case and the role of the law during
Reconstruction and its aftermath together challenge Sir Henry Maine's
claim that "the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a
movement from status to contract."14 7 Most Americans surely did not no-
tice Maine's evolutionary theory when he first published it in 1861, and
the Civil War dampened Americans' teleological faith for some time.
When the war ended, however, Congress tried to transform slaves and
Southern society, and, in effect, to recapitulate Maine's progressive evolu-
tion rapidly through constitutional amendments and statutes. The notori-
ous failure of that effort and the rise of the sharecropping system, which
sometimes imposed even more virulent forms of servitude on former slaves
such as the convict leasing system, demonstrates anew that there is a
chasm between the moment of liberation and the attainment of freedom.48
I will return in conclusion to Bob Cover's Justice Accused and to an
47. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND
ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 182 (1861). As specific examples, Maine uses the movement from
slave status to free contract, and the development from family hierarchy to individual independence.
Id. at 136-38. Though nearly everyone learns of Maine's aphorism in law school, this does not mean,
of course, that everyone accepts it or learns the extent to which Maine himself qualified his observa-
tion. See, e.g., M. COHEN, The Basis of Contract, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 69 (1982);
Jamieson, Status to Contract-Refuted or Refined, 39 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 333 (1980); see also M.
GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981) (provocative treatment of somer-
saulting legal perceptions of family and employment relationships).
48. This distinction is not only common in discussions of revolutionary movements, see, e.g., H.
BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983),
but is also central in the basic Western text on liberation and redemption, the Exodus story. See
generally M. WALZER, EXODUS AND REVOLUTION (1985) (study of Exodus as political idea about
redemption, liberation, and revolution).
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important story within the story of Herman Melville's Billy Budd, Sailor.
Bob began his book by developing the connection between Melville and
his father-in-law, Lemuel Shaw; then Bob used that connection to explore
larger themes about judges, moral complexity, and complicity. Melville
also often explored the consequences that follow decisions to remain aloof
or uninvolved. One thinks immediately, for example, of Bartleby, the
Scrivener and of Bartleby's strong preference not to act."9 By focusing on
the minor character of the surgeon in Billy Budd, I suggest a powerful
connection between repeated decisions against intervention made by influ-
ential legal actors and a central, haunting theme in the legal history of
race relations in the United States." In this concluding section, I address
the intersection of legal history and myth, a domain where Bob Cover
worked and lived with greatness.
II. MULTIFORM LAW AND SIMPLE ASSUMPTIONS: FROM
CONTRABAND TO FREEDOM
The United States already had a particularly mixed and multiform sys-
tem of law in the antebellum period, but the process of waging the war
and securing the peace entailed changes so great as to suggest a new legal
order.5" Despite the defense of slavery in paternalistic terms (a theme elu-
cidated in much of the best recent work on slavery)52 prior to the war, the
49. Bartleby, of course, simply reiterates in a mild, firm voice, "I would prefer not to" and
thereby aggravates and activates the equity lawyer who narrates the story, Bartleby, in BILLY BUDD,
supra note 39, at 3. Another barbed form of inaction occurs in the course of the deception of Amasa
Delano following the slave revolt in Benito Cereno. The colossal, noble slave Atufal play-acts his
unwillingness to ask pardon of the Spanish captain, even to have his chains removed, saying only,
"No, I am content." Id. at 183.
50. In the late-nineteenth century decisions, as in recent practice, the United States Supreme
Court emphasized the need to prove discriminatory motivation. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 551 (1896) (argument that enforced separation of two races imposes a badge of inferiority is a
fallacy, since "[ilf this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the
colored race chooses to put that construction on it"); Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 955 (1981) (clos-
ing street that passed through white neighborhood, thereby cutting off traffic from black neighborhood
to public park, did not violate civil rights statute or Constitution since no proof of discriminatory
motive). For a discussion of the search for discriminatory motive both historically and in the context of
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), see Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional Law, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 383 (1981).
51. See, e.g., E. AYERS, VENGEANCE & JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH CEN-
TURY AMERICAN SOUTH 141-82 (1984) (describing complicated, violent, paradoxical culture of crime
and punishment in antebellum South); H. HYMAN & W. WIECEE, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 386-438 (1982) (discussing broad purposes and
departures in federal legislation and constitutional amendments). See generally L. POSPISIL, ANTHRO-
POLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY 97-126 (1971) (anthropological perspective on mixed
aspects of legal systems generally); Soifer, Review Essay, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul
Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651, 655-70 (1979) (Civil War as watershed).
52. For the controversial introduction to the modern debate, see S. ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROB-
LEM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE (1959) (comparison of American slaves
to concentration camp victims and discussion of identification with oppressors). See generally M.
CUNLIFFE, CHATrEL SLAVERY AND WAGE SLAVERY: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN CONTEXT,
1930
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South, like the North, tried to balance reason and sentiment, humanity
and interest. As the debate over slavery became increasingly impassioned
in the 1850's, some southern states actually enacted statutes that allowed
free blacks to escape Northern wage-slavery by entering into bondage
under the masters of their choice.13 These statutes apparently were purely
symbolic. Yet they call to mind a problematic aspect of Lord North-
ington's recognition that "[n]ecessitous men are not, truly speaking, free
men."5  A problem in any consideration of the morass of contracts and
disputes about them, of course, is the determination of how necessitous or
unfree someone has to be before relief from an apparent contractual obli-
gation becomes appropriate. Even during the heyday of legal formalism,
for example, it appeared obvious to Justice David Brewer and a unani-
mous Supreme Court that "[i]t is within the undoubted power of govern-
ment to restrain some individuals from all contracts, as well as all individ-
uals from some contracts." 55 Nonetheless, it seems clear that contract law
1830-1860 (1979) (paternalism/autonomy debate between North and South); E. GENOVESE, ROLL,
JORDAN ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1972) (focusing on role of paternalism in defense
of slavery, but also as concept mandated by slaves to protect themselves); L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL
TRADITION IN AMERICA 145-201 (1955) (Whigs failed to unite capitalism and democracy; South
increased paternalistic claims in contrast); J. ROARK, MASTERS WITHOUT SLAVES: SOUTHERN
PLANTERS IN THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 72-74 (1976) (describing southern argument
for slavery as in blacks' best interest); D. ROBERTS, PATERNALISM IN EARLY VICTORIAN ENGLAND
(1979) (analyzing paternalistic attitudes and beliefs of English elite class of same period); K. STAMPP,
THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION 322-30 (1956) (noting paternalism of minority of slaveholders toward
some slaves); W. TAYLOR, CAVALIER & YANKEE: THE OLD SOUTH AND AMERICAN NATIONAL
CHARACTER 145-244, 261-324 (1961) (describing paternalism as core element of southern charac-
ter); M. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: Considerations of Humanity and
Interest 36 (1981) (southern slaveholders had difficulty explaining paternalism in northerners' lan-
guage of "individualism"); Donald, The Proslavery Argument Reconsidered, 31 J.S. HIST. 3 (1971);
Glickstein, 'Poverty is Not Slavery': American Abolitionists and the Competitive Labor Market, in
ANTISLAVERY RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECrIvEs ON THE ABOLrrIONISTS 195, 214-17 (L. Perry
& M. Feldman eds. 1979); Greenberg, Revolutionary Ideology and the Proslavery Argument: The
Abolition of Slavery in Antebellum South Carolina, 42 J.S. HiST. 365 (1976).
53. See, e.g., T. WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SourrH 41 & n.82 (1965) (citing Virginia
statute). Massachusetts included a similar provision in its first codification of law, the Body of Liber-
ties, in 1641 and later broadened the opportunity to consent to be a slave. See G. MOORE, NOTES ON
THE HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN MASSACHUSETS 12-15 (1866). Pride of place for the formal abolition
of slavery in the United States belongs to Vermont, but even the document that did so, the Vermont
Constitution of 1777, explicitly continued to permit consensual slavery. VT. CONST. art. I, § 1.
54. Russell v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139, 152 (1851) (quoting Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden
113 (1762)); see also L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 93-96, 185-86, 194-95 (1965)
(discussing use of law as instrument of social policy); M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 160-210 (1977) (19th century rejection of "substantive fairness"
justification of contract law). For entertaining and wise descriptions of contract, law, and the history
of legal thought, see G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); G. GILMORE, THE DEATH
OF CONTRACT (1974). For an insightful discussion of the problem of voluntary slavery in the context
of nineteenth century American utopian communities, see C. WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTO-
PIA 200-07 (1980).
55. Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165 (1895) (upholding conviction of lawyer for charg-
ing more than SIO set by federal law as maximum fee for processing military pension claim). The
current version of this restriction on the fee that may be charged for processing federal military pen-
sion claims-still set at $10-was upheld in Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S.
1931
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became increasingly formalized before the Civil War, and that formal
contract doctrine enjoyed its greatest dominance beginning in the decades
after the war.
Justice Joseph Story emphasized the formalist, either-or quality of judi-
cial review of contracts when he wrote in 1836 in his Equity
Jurisprudence:
For Courts of Equity, as well as Courts of law, act upon the ground,
that every person, who is not, from his peculiar condition or circum-
stances, under disability, is entitled to dispose of his property in such
manner and upon such terms, as he chooses; and whether his bar-
gains are wise and discreet, or otherwise, profitable or unprofitable,
are considerations, not for Courts of Justice, but for the party him-
self to deliberate upon. 6
Contract doctrine dominated American legal culture. As Willard Hurst
put it, the first seventy-five years of the nineteenth century were "[a]bove
all else, the years of contract in our law."'57 By the postbellum years, it
had become increasingly unlikely that courts would look beyond the forms
law uses to capture a meeting of minds in order to do justice.5 B
There was, and still is, an important tension between the formal as-
sumption of free-will bargaining among individuals in contract law and
Ct. 3180 (1985). Writing for the majority, then-Justice Rehnquist explained that the doctrine of
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) "is fortunately long gone, and with it the condemnation of
rational paternalism as a legitimate legislative goal." Id. at 3190. Trends in actual judicial applica-
tions of Justice Brewer's point are difficult to spot. When are certain categories of disability likely to
lead to judicial intervention? What "operative facts" will be deemed sufficiently unfair to produce
judicial invalidation or reworking of contractual obligations? As Grant Gilmore put it, "Corbin coun-
seled not only that we should study all the cases but that we should study them not so much for their
doctrinal statements as for what he liked to call their 'operative facts.' " G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW, supra note 54, at 79. For an indication that Corbin and Williston were not as far
apart as our use of them as symbols in intellectual legal history tends to suggest, see Williston, Free-
dom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 379 (1921) ("The extent to which freedom of contract should
be limited inevitably becomes a question of degree to which not even an attempt at an answer can be
made without reference to time, place, and circumstance ....").
56. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 245-247, at 249-51 (1836),
quoted in K. NEWMYER, supra note 40, at 294-95.
57. J.W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
UNITED STATES 18 (1956) (belief in and manipulation of contract law central to "release of energy");
see also E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MJEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 11-39 (1970) (ideology of freedom of contract basic to growth of
Republican party); Dyson, Contract Stability in Wartime: The Example of the Confederacy, 19 AM.
J.L. HIsT. 216 (1975) (Confederate attorneys general adhered strictly to contract precedent). For a
magisterial discussion of contemporaneous developments in English law, see P. ATIYAH, THE RISE
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979).
58. Though theories of the phenomenon vary, legal formalism undeniably had set in with a ven-
geance by the 1860's. See, e.g., JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 1, at 200; G. GILMORE, supra note 54,
at 41-67; M. HORWITZ, supra note 54, at 253-66. See generally M. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN
AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1957) (cross-disciplinary intellectual history of as-
sault on formalism in Progressive era).
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the categorization rules employed in other legal realms.59 The process of
stripping away entire groups from the sui juris paradigm in contract law
was already well underway by the beginning of the Civil War. Even as
committed a votary of legal science as Joseph Story, for example, had
attached exceptions and caveats to his "forceful endorsement of the will
theory of contract."60 Most important, the Civil War itself shook and re-
cast the entire legal mix.
I turn first to the remarkably rapid transformation of the legal status of
blacks during the Civil War. Then, I consider briefly the effect of the
commitment to freedom in the Thirteenth Amendment and the statutes
premised on its authority. In conclusion, I discuss why the legacy of forty
years of wandering following slavery was not even an approach to the
promised land, but instead an almost complete evisceration of statutory
and constitutional promises made to the freedmen.
A. The Status of Former Slaves
During the Civil War, the legal status of slaves in both North and
South changed dramatically. North and South placed slaves in shifting
categories both through law and out of military necessity. By the end of
the war, the Confederacy was offering freedom to slaves who would fight
for the Lost Cause.61 Though restricted in scope and questionable in con-
stitutionality, Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was only the most fa-
mous step in the rapid legal transformation of the "dark human cloud that
clung like remorse" 2 to Union troops for protection.
59. For deservedly famous analyses of the idea that ethical issues lurk in contract cases, see, for
example, Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 281-90
(1947); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 629 (1943); Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704,
731-37 (1931); see also W. FAULKNER, THE HAMLET 317 (1940) ("If a man aint got gumption
enough to protect himself, it's his own look-out . . ... "). See generally Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil,
and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 565; Kronman,
Paternalism and Contract Law, 92 YALE L.J. 783 (1983); Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bar-
gaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982); Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do
Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483; Klare, Book Review, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 876 (1979).
60. K. NEWMYER, supra note 40, at 294. Story was famous, for example, for a series of decisions
in which he intervened to protect sailors from themselves and the contracts they had made. He defined
seamen as "special wards" because of their "rashness, thoughtlessness and improvidence." Id. at 151
(quoting Brown v. Lull, 4 F. Gas. 407 (C.C.D. Mass. 1836) (No. 2,018)). For a discussion of similar
paternalism toward sailors against a backdrop of federal statutory changes and the Thirteenth
Amendment, and a description of enthusiastic judicial intervention purportedly on behalf of suijuris
individuals freely bargaining together, see Soifer, supra note 37, at 251-52, 262-63.
61. See E. THOMAS, THE CONFEDERATE NATION 1861-1865, at 290-92 (1979). The Confeder-
ate approach followed a 1735 Georgia statute on the same subject. See A.L. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE
MAT'TER OF COLOR 216-27 (1978); Soifer, Slavery and the Law: A Study in Contradiction (Book
Review), 56 TEx. L. REV. 1319, 1322-26 (1978).
62. See W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 18 (1903). The best work specifically on
the Emancipation Proclamation remains J.H. FRANKLIN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION
1933
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In the early stages of the war, slaves who came behind Union lines
were defined as "contraband," in keeping with the analysis of Edward
Pierce, a Boston lawyer who tried to sort out the confused legal status and
impact of the war in an Atlantic Monthly article in November, 1861 .1
Pierce claimed that, at a minimum, slaves who escaped or were captured
by Union troops enjoyed the protections of Magna Charta and the Decla-
ration of Independence, though their constitutional status remained ob-
scure. This appeal to fundamental law soon became popular among Re-
publican Congressmen.
The history of Major General David Hunter's regional emancipation
order in May 1862 underscores how the presence of former slaves among
Union troops skewered the old paternalistic ideology of slavery. Hunter,
who had once commanded Jefferson Davis and who had risen rapidly in
rank after serving Lincoln as a self-appointed body guard in the early
days of Lincoln's presidency, decided the time had come to recruit a troop
composed entirely of black soldiers. This addition to his general emanci-
pation order was necessary, Hunter explained to headquarters in Wash-
ington, so that black troops, without benefit of a "fugitive master law,"
could "pursue, capture, and bring back those persons of whose protection
they have been suddenly bereft."16 4 Hunter's sardonic reversal of the pa-
ternalistic justification of slavery, as well as his recognition that black
troops could fight for their freedom, did not immediately carry the day;
Hunter was transferred in part, it appears, because of his exuberance.6 5
But within two months, Congress decided to seize certain southern land
and to free some contraband slaves. Lincoln reluctantly signed the Second
Confiscation Act in July, 1862,66 the same week that his cabinet received
word of Lincoln's proposed emancipation proclamation. Members of exec-
utive branch now awaited the good news from the front they thought nec-
essary to support the proclamation."'
They had a long wait. In the meantime the public, hungry for war
(1963).
63. Pierce, The Contrabands at Fortress Monroe, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1861, at 626,
reprinted in E. PIERCE, ENFRANCHISEMENT AND CITIZENSHIP: ADDRESSES AND PAPERS 20-52
(1896). For discussions of political and legal changes concerning war aims, and rapidly altered per-
ceptions of blacks during the course of the Civil War, see H. BELz, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM:
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND FREEDMEN'S RIGHTS, 1361-1866 (1976); D.T. CORNISH, THE SA-
BLE ARM: NEGRO TROOPS IN THE UNION ARMY, 1861-1865 (1956); H. TREFOUSSE, supra note 36,
at 280-86, 344-45.
64. Quoted in Sproat, Blueprint for Radical Reconstruction, 23 J.S. HIST. 25, 30-31 (1957).
65. Id. This incident also provided early evidence of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton's duplicity.
His inconsistency and lack of candor later figured prominently in the struggle surrounding the im-
peachment of President Andrew Johnson. According to Pierce, blacks in fact had participated mili-
tarily as early as August 28, 1861, working a gun aboard the Minnesota during the successful bom-
bardment of South Carolina's Sea Islands. See E. PIERCE, supra note 63, at 640.
66. Second Confiscation Act, 12 Stat. 589-92 (July 17, 1862).
67. See J.H. FRANKLIN, supra note 62, at 40-43.
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news, learned that "contraband" slaves could farm with impressive success
on land from which their owners fled in front of the advancing Union
armies. A new federal policy toward slaves, however, curtailed this early
"rehearsal for reconstruction." 8 Lincoln now endorsed General Hunter's
renewed demand for black troops and military necessity began to siphon
away black farm workers.
Tales about the courage of former slaves fighting in the Union Army
transformed their popular image as well as their legal status. The bravery
of the black soldiers of the 54th Massachusetts regiment commanded by
Robert Gould Shaw probably provided the best-publicized example, but
the long years of war supplied countless others.6 9 Increasingly, northern
leaders spoke of the former slaves' proven allegiance to the federal govern-
ment and the government's corresponding obligation to protect those who
fought so courageously.
70
B. Lincoln's Views Transformed and the Thirteenth Amendment
Adopted
The metamorphosis of Lincoln's own distinctly moderate views on the
status of blacks is revealing. In his First Inaugural Address, Lincoln en-
68. W.L. ROSE, REHEARSAL FOR RECONSTRUCTION: THE PORT ROYAL EXPERIMENT (1964)
(story of Sea Islands told largely from perspectives of former slaves); T. ROSENGARTEN, supra note
42 (account of same locale based upon, and reproducing much of, diary of plantation slave owner).
69. There were numerous accounts of the remarkable courage of black soldiers in the assault on
Fort Wagner. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 63, at 640; CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 173, 1294
(1866) (speeches by Rep. James Wilson).
Black soldiers were by no means treated equally. Thus, for example, Frederick Douglass was at
first unsure about whether to support enlistment of blacks under conditions of formal discrimination
in pay and job assignments, and informal discrimination in numerous other ways. See generally J.H.
FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEGROES 221-24 (5th ed.
1980); J. MCPHERSON, THE NEGRO'S CIVIL WAR: How AMERICAN NEGROES FELT AND ACTED
DURING THE WAR FOR THE UNION (1965).
70. The reciprocal relationship between allegiance and the government's duty to protect formed a
central tenet of mid-nineteenth century political theory. For example, Lincoln's quite conservative
Attorney General, Edward Bates, issued an opinion distinguishing between civil and political rights
and arguing that "the duty of allegiance and the right of protection . . . are correlative obligations,
the one the price of the other." 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382, 395 (1862). This theme runs throughout the
debates in the 39th Congress. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 605 (1866) (Sen. Trum-
bull: "[A] positive duty upon us to pass such laws if we find discriminations still adhered to in the
States where slavery has recently existed."); id. at 1118 (Rep. Wilson: "I cannot yield up the weapons
which slavery placed in our hands now that they may be wielded in the holy cause of liberty and just
government."). The obligation of government actively to protect labor in particular was basic to Re-
publican ideology of the period. See E. FONER, supra note 57, at 11-39, 308-17.
The notion that allegiance and protection are reciprocally related has deep roots in Anglo-American
social and legal theory. See, e.g., 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 47-48 ("[T]he original con-
tract of society [is] . . .that the community should guard the rights of each individual member, and
that (in return for this protection) each individual should submit to the laws of the community."); J.
CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT 55 (R. Cralle ed. 1943) (1853) ("Liberty, indeed,
though among the greatest of blessings, is not so great as that of protection . . ... "). See generally
Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws-A Historical Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
499, 507-10 (1985).
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dorsed a Thirteenth Amendment that would have guaranteed federal non-
interference with property rights in slaves.7 Though he eventually would
shift to a still different position, by 1863 Lincoln had already moved well
beyond his early flirtation with colonization schemes and reversals of
emancipation orders issued by his generals. By the time of the Republican
convention in June 1864, Lincoln and his party stood firmly for a Thir-
teenth Amendment that constitutionalized freedom for former slaves. Lin-
coln now declared that "[ilf the people should, by whatever mode or
means, make it an executive duty to re-enslave such persons, another, and
not I, must be their instrument to perform it. ' ' 72 Lincoln's public stance
and intensive lobbying efforts were instrumental in securing passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment. Widely recognized at the time as a fundamental
shift in the constitutional order, the new amendment called forth unprece-
dented use of national power to protect national rights.73 It remains the
only constitutional provision held clearly to reach private conduct. From
the southern perspective, the Thirteenth Amendment expropriated prop-
erty worth billions of dollars, without compensation. But the remarks of
Senator Lyman Trumbull, a moderate Illinois Republican and chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, typified the majority view in Con-
gress. Trumbull argued that the amendment did more than permit Con-
gress to protect the former slaves. He stated:
Congress is bound to see that freedom is in fact secured to every
person throughout the land; he must be fully protected in all his
rights of person and property; and any legislation or any public sen-
timent which deprives any human being in the land of those great
rights of liberty will be in defiance of the Constitution.74
71. A. Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: His SPEECHES
AND WRITINGS 579-80 (R. Basler ed. 1946) [hereinafter LINCOLN SPEECHES AND WRITINGS].
72. A. Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 6, 1864), in LINCOLN SPEECHES AND WRIT-
INGS, supra note 71, at 773, 789. As Richard Sewell summarizes: "What is surprising, perhaps, given
the bigotry of the age is that nearly all Republicans defended the Negro's manhood and insisted that
he be accorded those inalienable rights set forth in the Declaration of Independence." R. SEWELL,
supra note 44, at 327.
73. The Thirteenth Amendment states: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.' U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. Though the process
of passage and ratification was controversial, which is hardly surprising in the context of the war still
raging, Lincoln supported the amendment with uncharacteristic enthusiasm. Lincoln, whose "educa-
bility was outstanding," H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 51, at 275, now eagerly sought the
Thirteenth Amendment, which he considered the "King's cure for all . . . evils." 8 A. LINCOLN,
supra note 19, at 254-55; see H. TREFOUSSE, supra note 36, at 299-304; The Fourteenth Amend-
ment in Light of the Thirteenth: Not Cramped by the Old Technicalities, in H. HYMAN & W.
WIECEK, supra note 51, at 386-438.
74. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1865).
I do not claim that the Congressmen who dominated the 38th and 39th Congresses acted exclusively
or even predominantly out of pure benevolence or that they were free of racism. See, e.g., G. FRED-
RICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARAC-
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Some Congressmen gave examples of the personal and property rights
that were to be protected; 5 others simply invoked natural law and the
Declaration of Independence as the source for the basic civil rights that
they insisted the amendment now guaranteed;76 many relied on the catch-
phrases of free labor and Republican ideology. 7
To ensure that these basic rights would be protected, Congress for the
first time included an enforcement clause in the second section of the
amendment explicitly authorizing Congress to guarantee the rights in the
first section. Congress quickly used this new power to secure a wide range
TER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914, at 125-27 (1971); G. FREDRICKSON, THE INNER CIVIL WAR:
NORTHERN INTELLECTUALS AND THE CRISIS OF THE UNION 183-98 (1965); L. LITWACK, NORTH
OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES 1790-1860 (1960); R. SEWELL, supra note 44; V.J.
VOEGELI, FREE BUT NOT EQUAL: THE MIDWEST AND THE NEGRO DURING THE CIVIL WAR
(1967). Struggles with Lincoln and, more significantly and much more bitterly, the congressional
battles with Andrew Johnson, were essential factors. See, e.g., W. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS:
CONGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1867 (1963). Compare L. Cox & J. Cox, POLrTcS,
PRINCIPLE, PREJUDICE, 1865-1866: DILEMMA OF RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA (1963) (arguing dom-
inance by Radical Republicans, ultimately undercut by President Johnson) and H. TREFOUSSE,
supra note 36 (arguing that Lincoln and Radicals shared basic desire for national protection of
blacks) with M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RE-
CONSTRUCTION 1863-1869 (1974) (arguing a fundamental conservative strain among Republicans).
In addition, the desire to keep blacks confined geographically to the South posed a serious problem to
Northern Republicans. Southern representation, which would now be based on the entire black popu-
lation rather than the constitutional compromise of three-fifths, threatened to mean the victory for the
Lost Cause at the ballot boxes that it had been denied on the battlefields. Northerners viewed the
increase in representation as an immediate political problem of great importance. Consideration of
these practical political issues helps explain such phenomena as Thaddeus Stevens's famous speeches
concerning Republican ascendancy. See E. FONER, Thaddeus Stevens, Confiscation, and Reconstruc-
tion, in POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 128-49 (1980).
75. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1319 (1864) (remarks of Sen. Harlan) (Thir-
teenth Amendment protects every man's "property," "the rewards of his own labor," and "hallowed
family relations"); id. at 1199, 1202-03 (remarks of Rep. Wilson, chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee) (Thirteenth Amendment guarantees to blacks all basic rights such as freedom of speech
and freedom of religion, and establishes "a nation of equals").
76. See, e.g., id. at 1319 (remarks of Sen. Wilson) (Thirteenth Amendment is an affirmative
guarantee of "the sacred rights of human nature" enunciated in the Declaration of Independence);
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 1118 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Wilson) (proclaiming Thirteenth
Amendment to be a guarantee of "the greater fundamental rights which it is the true office of Govern-
ment to protect").
77. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1295 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger)
(Thirteenth Amendment fulfills government's obligation to afford the "humblest" citizen "full and
ample protection at the cost of the Government" because "the highest obligation which the Govern-
ment owes to the citizen in return for the allegiance exacted of him is to secure him in the protection
of his rights"); J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 157-97 (1965).
As Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts pointed out, passage of the Thirteenth Amendment
signified the replacement of a moral rule against slavery with a coercive, positive law prohibition:
The organic law is now right, and instead of dragging or keeping the popular sentiment down,
it is lifting it up to the plane of its own high ideal. He that treats the negro unjustly cannot
now, as before, plead the sanction of the Constitution; but he violates human as well as divine
law. The gain is, therefore, immense; and it gives the negro and his friends high vantage-
ground in the conflict still in process. Public sentiment may not yet be fully up to its proper
enforcement; but the tendency-it is a source of comfort and courage-is toward it.
3 H. WILSON, RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA 454 (1877); see H. HYMAN &
W. WIECEK, supra note 51, at 302-03.
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of civil rights, further demonstrating that it viewed the Thirteenth
Amendment as a broad guarantee from the outset.
The Thirteenth Amendment altered federalism. It established an af-
firmative role for Congress to protect fundamental rights throughout the
nation. The constitutional guarantee of universal civil freedom entailed
federal protection of individual rights. Yet this protective re-ordering
might imply an inequality between freedmen and other citizens.78 What
did protection of basic civil rights mean in practical terms? The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 reaffirmed that the framers and ratifiers of the new
constitutional guarantee intended to alter the relationship of former slaves
to their former masters as well as the relationship of the states to the
federal government. But these law-makers, committed as many of them
were to securing the peace that had cost so much blood, could not resolve
the pervasive conflict in their legislative scheme between paternalism and
individualism. Thus the first right listed within the enumeration of equal
rights guaranteed by section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was "the
right to make and enforce contracts."
7 9
That there was a deep ambivalence about how to protect the new freed-
men after the Civil War is not surprising; indeed, it haunts us still.a0 The
rub, of course, is in determining who needs protection and in providing it
without stigmatizing or disabling alleged beneficiaries. Lincoln's definition
of the object of government dramatically reveals this conflict: "[T]o elevate
the condition of men, to lift artificial weights from all shoulders; to clear
78. See supra note 37. The best of the excellent work on Republican ideology is still to be found,
in my opinion, in E. FONER, supra note 57; D. MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND
THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS, 1862-1872 (1967).
79. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982
(1982)). For an extensive discussion of the context and probable meaning of the passage of this act
over President Andrew Johnson's veto, see Soifer, supra note 51, at 690-96. See generally H. BELZ,
EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS: POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA
(1978); M. BENEDICT, supra note 74; D. DONALD, LIBERTY AND UNION (1978); H. HYMAN, A
MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTI-
TUION (1973)).
80. We still, perhaps increasingly, tend to forget that even John Stuart Mill limited his liberty
principle to "human beings in the maturity of their faculties" and further limited the principle to
those "capable of being improved by free and equal discussion." J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (R.
McCallum ed. 1947). Mill in fact emphasized that "[t]hose who are still in a state to require being
taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external in-
jury." Id. He found that category quite extensive when he actually got involved in law-making for
India. J.S. MILL, Considerations of Representative Government, in 19 COLLECTED WORKS OF J.S.
MILL: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND SOCIETY 562, 567-68 (J.M. Robson ed. 1977) (identifying India as
one of the British "dependencies" not "fitted for representative government" and arguing that British
domination of such dependencies is a legitimate mode of government only if "it is the one which in the
existing state of civilization of the subject people, most facilitates their transition to a higher stage of
improvement"). Mill's views on paternalism are discussed in F. BERGER, HAPPINESS, JUSTICE, &
FREEDOM: THE MORAL & POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF J.S. MILL 265-71 (1984). For a fine recent
discussion of similar issues, see Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Men-
tally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
111 (1987).
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the paths of laudable pursuit for all; to afford all an unfettered start and a
fair chance in the race of life."'" Addressing the Georgia legislature in
February, 1866, former Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens
provided an ironic echo of Lincoln's words: "Ample and full protection
should be secured to the negroes so that they may stand equal before the
law in the possession and enjoyment of all rights of person, liberty and
property. '8 2 Paradoxically, however, while the Civil War still raged,
Frederick Douglass entered the debate about what to do with the former
slaves and insisted: "Do nothing with them. Your doing with them is the
great misfortune. 8s3 The American Freedmen's Inquiry Commission
added its prestige to Douglass' argument. Although in their preliminary
report Commissioners Samuel Gridley Howe, Robert Dale Owen, and
James McKaye suggested federal guardianship of former slaves, in their
final "blueprint for reconstruction" these prominent do-gooders endorsed
a "let alone system." '8  No government aid should be offered, Howe be-
lieved, "unless our protection is demanded by the sufferers themselves."85
We cannot know how Lincoln would have directed the federal govern-
ment to protect former slaves. He may have intended to provide forty-acre
plots, to be purchased by freedmen with profits they made by farming
confiscated southern land. We do know that the promise of forty acres
(with or without the mule) was more than a mere pipe dream.8" General
81. A. Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in LINCOLN SPEECHES
AND WRITINGS, supra note 71, at 594, 607.
82. Stephens is quoted at 5 J. RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 560 (1904). It is
difficult to determine fully what Lincoln or Stephens intended. Scholars have examined carefully
Lincoln's views on race and free labor. See, e.g., L. Cox, LINCOLN AND BLACK FREEDOM: A STUDY
IN PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP (1981); E. FONER, supra note 57, at 260-300; B. QUARLES, LINCOLN
AND THE NEGRO (1962); see also Boritt, Looking for Lincoln in the 1980's, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8,
1987, Book Review, at 1, col. 1.
Stephens is perhaps more of a puzzle. In his 1866 speech, he may have been playing to a northern
or congressional audience, which was carefully watching events in the newly constituted southern
legislatures, or he may have been echoing the paternalism of the old order. In any case, Stephens did
go on to remind his fellow Georgians of the loyalty of many blacks to their masters even during the
Civil War and to assert that "[l]egislation should ever look to the protection of the weak against the
strong." 5 J. RHODES, supra, at 561.
More important than Stephens's motivation is his nominal dedication to the vague notion that legis-
latures should intervene to assure a fair and equal start in the race of life-a notion also voiced by
many congressional leaders. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118, 1294 (1866) (remarks of
Rep. Wilson); id. at 605 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull).
83. 3 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 188-89 (P. Foner ed. 1955).
84. H. BELZ, supra note 63, at 69-74 (quoting letter from Samuel Gridley Howe to Sen. Charles
Sumner (Dec. 19, 1863)); Sproat, supra note 64, at 34-44 (describing Commission's formula as "give
them the means, give them a chance, and then let them alone"). The Commission's notion of giving
blacks a chance included confiscations of Southern land and constitutional amendments to protect the
civil and political rights of blacks.
85. H. BELZ, supra note 63, at 74.
86. See, e.g., Cox, The Promise of Land for the Freedmen, 45 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 413,
440 (1958); see C. OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE: THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND BLACK
LAND OWNERSHIP (1978); Abbott, Free Land, Free Labor, and the Freedmen's Bureau, 30 AGRIC.
HIST. 150 (1956); see also E. FONER, supra note 74, at 128-49 (discussing Thaddeus Stevens' role in
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Banks took some preliminary steps towards land redistribution in Louisi-
ana during the war."7 General William T. Sherman's famous Field Order
No. 15 specifically allocated forty-acre plots to freed slaves."' We also
know something of Lincoln's hopes, suggested, for example, in his instruc-
tion to General Banks, to create "some practical system by which the two
races could gradually live themselves out of their old relation to each
other, and both come out better prepared for the new."89
C. Settled Expectations
Even more than nineteenth century Americans' aversion to redistribu-
tion of property by government-at least when the redistribution was visi-
ble 9 -the ideology of formalistic contract law was, I believe, directly im-
plicated in the emergence of a practical peonage system after the war.
Recently, scholars have debated the relative efficiency of slavery and of the
sharecropping system with considerable intensity. 1 Moreover, through
Leon Litwack's marvelous kaleidoscopic portrait of complex human rela-
tionships92-complementing a host of other fine studies of the chaotic so-
debate over confiscation of rebel property). The best-told story of the bureaucratic wrangling within
the Freedmen's Bureau over what the freedmen should get and how they would be protected remains
W. McFEELY, YANKEE STEPFATHER: GENERAL 0.0. HOWARD AND THE FREEDMEN (1968).
87. L. Cox, supra note 82, at 75-111; W. McFEELY, supra note 86, at 169-70.
88. Sherman's plan for the Sea Islands and the southeastern coastline was rescinded when Trea-
sury Department officials won this particular bureaucratic turf battle with the military on the
grounds that the redistribution would have constituted theft from the Confederate owners. See, e.g., L.
Cox, supra note 82, at 27-28; L. GERTEIS, FROM CONTRABAND TO FREEDMAN: FEDERAL POLICY
TOWARD SOUTHERN BLACKS, 1861-1865, at 153-92 (1973); D. NIEMAN, To SET THE LAW IN
MOTION: THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868, at 11-12, 65
(1979) (inadequate personnel to control contract abuses or to protect black workers against violence of
planters and imposition of terms of Black Codes despite federal invalidation); W.L. ROSE, supra note
68, at 346-77; May, Continuity and Change in the Labor Program of the Union Army and the
Freedmen's Bureau, 17 CIVIL WAR Hisr. 245 (1971).
89. H. TREFOUSSE, supra note 36, at 282; see also L. Cox, supra note 82, at 25-26 (calling
Lincoln "paternal but not paternalistic" in his long-term focus on "economic concept of free society").
90. The prohibition against taking from A to give to B has often been characterized as one of the
clearest restrictions on government. See, e.g., Loan Ass'n v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655,
662-63 (1875); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.). But as Morton Horwitz
points out, even in the antebellum period people often went to law to mask subsidies or transfers of
property. M. HORwrrz, supra note 54, at 99-101. The Thirteenth Amendment undeniably altered
the property rights of Southerners without compensating them.
91. See, e.g., Weiner, Higgs & Woodman, Class Structure and Economic Development in the
American South, 1865-1955, 84 AM. HisT. REV. 970 (1979) (colloquy on sharecropping debate).
Compare J. MANDLE, THE ROOTS OF BLACK POVERTY: THE SOUTHERN PLANTATION ECONOMY
AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (1978); R. RANSOM & R. SUTrcH, ONE KIND OF FREEDOM: THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF EMANCIPATION (1977) and G. WRIGHT, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
COTTON SOUTH (1978) with S. DECANIO, AGRICULTURE IN THE POSTBELLUM SOUTH (1974) and
R. HIGGS, COMPETITION AND COERCION: BLACKS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 1868-1914
(1977). For discussion of lost opportunities and the suppression of efforts by blacks to organize in the
half century after emancipation, see W. HARRIS, THE HARDER WE RUN: BLACK WORKERS SINCE
THE CIVIL WAR 7-50 (1982); Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or
Competitive?, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1984).
92. L. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY (1979).
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cial reality at the end of the storm of slavery93 -we can more fully appre-
ciate the difficulty as well as the hope that emancipation entailed. Yet we
have little work on law in the trenches during the period,94 and scarcely
any attention has been paid to the effect of old contract law on the new
status of freedmen.
The legal situation in the South at the end of the Civil War was a
chaotic blend of old and quickly emerging doctrines in the "private law"
realms of property and contract law.95 The federal government interposed
an unprecedented administrative mechanism, staffed by the military,
which soon collapsed into the sort of bureaucratic wrangling all too famil-
iar to the modern eye. A sharp tension developed between the residual
folkways of slavery and the new, vastly different ideas of what post-war
legal freedom entailed. Soon savage armed resistance emerged to chal-
lenge the brief attempt to use national "public" law as an instrument for
the liberation of four million slaves. 7
These multiple layers of law present internal contradictions and intrac-
table difficulties. A neat, pyramidal structure simply did not exist in the
legal culture; constitutional law was not perched atop the legal order. Af-
ter the war, the most private and individualistic legal categories seemed
quickly and convincingly to overcome all others.98 Contract law triumphed
93. See, e.g., L. POWELL, NEW MASTERS: NORTHERN PLANTERS DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1980); J. ROARK, supra note 52, at 196-209. For a recent documentary history,
which also contains fine descriptive essays, see 1 I. BERLIN, B. FIELDS, T. GLYMPH, J. REIDY & L.
ROWLAND, FREEDOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF EMANCIPATION, 1861-1865 (1985). The best
example of a local study is still probably J. WILLIAMSON, AFTER SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN SOUTH
CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION (1963), now supplemented by J. WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCI-
BLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION (1984)
[hereinafter J. WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE] (analyzing violent mix of race, sex, and class
in Southern "mentality"); see also E. FONER, The Emancipated Worker, in NOTHING BUT FREE-
DOM: EMANICPATION AND ITS LEGACY 74-110 (1983) (study of 1876 strikes on rice plantations in
South Carolina). For a good compilation of local studies, see RECONSTRUCTION AND REDEMPTION IN
THE SOUTH (L. Olsen ed. 1980). For general historiography, see Cohen, Negro Involuntrary Servi-
tude in the South, 1865,1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J.S. HIST. 31 (1976); Woodman, Sequel
to Slavery: The New History Views the Postbellum South, 43 J.S. HIST. 523 (1977).
94. But see E. AYERS, supra note 51, at 141-222; Hall, Political Power and Constitutional
Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871-72, 33 EMORY L.J. 921 (1984); Haws
& Namorato, Race, Property Rights, and the Economic Consequences of Reconstruction: A Case
Study, 32 VAND. L. REV. 305 (1979); Westwood, Getting Justice for the Freedman, 16 How. LJ.
492 (1971).
95. See, e.g., L. LITWACK, supra note 92, at 408-25 (1979) (discussing substance of contracts
between freedmen and whites in South and attitudes of southern freedmen and whites to those con-
tracts); D. NIEMAN, supra note 88, at 97-98, 161-71 (Bureau officials unable to regulate local affairs
to protect freedman).
96. See L. LITWACK, supra note 92, at 336-49.
97. See, e.g., E. AYERS, supra note 51, at 142-65; J. WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE,
supra note 93, at 19-35; B. WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHIS AND DISHONOR IN THE
OLD SOUTH 453-61 (1982). See generally A. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE KU KLUX CONSPIR-
ACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (1971) (fine overview of role of Klan).
98. Compare Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321 (1869) (upholding segregation and prohibition against
miscegenation as valid legislative regulations of social status and "civil contract") with Williams v.
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in the legal imagination and permeated popular belief. The "grand yet
simple declaration of universal freedom" '99 set out in the Thirteenth
Amendment, and elaborated in the first section of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act,' 00 appeared overly intrusive, nationalistic, unsettling, and perhaps
old-fashioned. It was the era of Horatio Alger characters and of Thomas
M. Cooley's limitations on government. 0 ' It was the heyday of contract's
presumed free meeting of the minds.'0 2
Simple survival was excrutiatingly difficult in the South just after Ap-
pomattox. The stricken Southern economy grew even worse in the follow-
ing years. As credit virtually disappeared, Confederate money lost all
value, land prices plunged, an already severe labor shortage worsened,
and unusually bad weather caused crop failures in 1866 and 1867.103
Waters, 36 Ga. 454 (1867) (enforcing contract after holding that parol evidence rule barred oral
testimony by illiterate sharecropper and holding that it was sufficient that Bureau officials and judges
had read contract-which seems excessively favorable to landowner-to sharecropper, and that land-
owner could testify about disappointing crops) and Comas v. Reddish, 35 Ga. 236 (1866) (warning
public functionaries to "be vigilant in preventing any one, under the name of master, from getting the
control of the labor and services of. . .[a] minor apprentice, as if he were still a slave."). The South
Carolina courts were considerably more conservative, insisting that the Emancipation Proclamation
had no legal effect, since "[tjhe President had not the right to make them free." Pickett v. Wilkins, 13
S.C. Eq. (13 Rich. Eq.) 366, 367 (1866) (partition of estate executed in 1864 valid, even though some
heirs received only slaves); see also Bailey v. Greenville & C.R.R., 2 S.C. 312 (1870) (one who hired
slaves from owner must pay owner whether or not slaves were liberated by Emancipation Proclama-
tion); Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 S.C. 283, 306-07 (1870) (enforcing payment of debts involving slaves
prior to emancipation not against public policy); Burgess v. Carpenter, 2 S.C. 7, 10 (1870) (black
sharecropper a co-partner, not servant, so he was "sui juris" and could not sue owner of land for his
injury).
99. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1873).
100. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982
(1982)).
101. The first Horatio Alger novel in the Ragged Dick series was published in 1868, see E.
HOYT, HORATIO'S Boys: THE LIFE AND WORKS OF HORATIO ALGER, JR. 74-84 (1974), the same
year Judge Cooley first published his A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Boston 1868).
Cooley's title was less snappy, but his book's influence may have been as great. See, e.g., C. JACOBS,
LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G.
TIEDEMAN AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 128, 151-52 (1954); B.
TwISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT
18-41 (1942). See generally S. FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A STUDY
OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865-1901, at 128-29, 142-43 (1956) (discussing Cooley's
influence on the development of laissez-faire constitutionalism); P. PALUDAN, supra note 14, at
249-73 (biographical chapter on Cooley).
102. See, e.g., S. FINE, supra note 101, at 56-73 (impact of laissez-faire economists in postbellum
period); G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 54, at 46-67 (formalism during
legal "Age of Faith"); B. TwISs, supra note 101, at 18-62 (use of radical individualism by lawyers
and judges). For a largely parallel description of doctrinal developments in England, see P. ATYAH,
supra note 57, at 388-97, 671 (formalization of contract and demise of equity). Litwack observes that
"Freedmen's Bureau officers and northern white missionaries and teachers advanced the classic mid-
nineteenth century self-help ideology," L. LITWACK, supra note 92, at 403. As one Bureau commis-
sioner in Mississippi scolded the former slaves, "[y]our contracts were explained to you, and their
sacredness impressed upon you, again and again." Id. at 409.
103. W. MCFEELY, supra note 86, at 162; J. ROARK, supra note 52, at 148, 170-80; sources
cited supra note 91.
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Contract law began to fill some of the gap created by the abrupt termina-
tion of the hierarchical status relationships of the antebellum period.
Paradoxically, when many former masters and slaves declined to enter
into voluntary contracts with one another, the Freedmen's Bureau forced
them into "contractual" relationships. General Banks had imposed a
mandatory year-long contract scheme in occupied Louisiana during the
war. The Bureau officials developed variations on the theme, stressing
order rather than consent.104 Though direct evidence of extralegal dispute
settlement is sparse, we have strong reason to believe that resistance was
far more widespread than Bureau reports indicate.10 5 For example, plant-
ers formed local associations to resist contracts with freedmen altogether,
or to hold down wage scales by agreeing not to bid for labor. 06 When
former slaves learned that their claims to own the land they had worked
and watered with the sweat of their brows would not be honored, 10 7 some
wandered off or appropriated the farm animals they had cared for and
believed they now could legitimately claim.108 If blacks publicly dared to
104. In Louisiana, Banks used military marshals to enforce penalties for disobedience and lazi-
ness; idleness was a crime. The plan included a wage scale and had a maximum hour provision; it
also guaranteed rations, schooling, and medical care. See H. BELZ, supra note 63, at 45-46, 96; May,
supra note 88, at 250-51. Litwack describes in vivid detail the contract enforcement approach of
many Freedmen's Bureau officers. L. LITWACK, supra note 92, at 284-85, 408-28. In significant
ways, the Freedmen's Bureau and its failures represent a stage of nascent federal bureaucracy, though
the magnitude of its task and the limitations and shortcomings of the military personnel it employed
made its job unusually difficult.
105. L. GERTEIS, supra note 88, at 190-91 (officers of severely undermanned Bureau ordered not
to arrest whites charged by blacks unless "proof is clear" in "serious criminal cases"); W. McFEELY,
supra note 86, at 211-66, 273-87 (detailing bitter internal divisions within Bureau and Bureau's
inability to deal with starvation, to prosecute individual white murderers, or to control rioting against
blacks); L. LrrWACK, supra note 92, at 284 (Freedmen's Bureau seldom intervened in legal matters,
though it had the power to do so, and thus "revealed more about the predilections of Bureau officers
than the impartiality of civil justice").
106. D. NIEMAN, supra note 88, at 97-98, 172-75 (laws passed and administered after the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 invalidated Black Codes still imposed harsher penalties on blacks, punished va-
grancy severely, and forbade enticing blacks from year-long employment contracts); L. LrrWACK,
supra note 92, at 415-16 (white planters formed combinations and used violence to control wages,
ability of blacks to lease land, and other aspects of contracts).
107. W. McFEELY, supra note 86, provides the most powerful description of the end of the
promise of land, including the spectacle of Bureau officials driving blacks off land they had worked
throughout the Civil War which they were led to believe was theirs. McFeely also describes the
willingness of 0.0. Howard, at the end of his tenure as head of the Bureau, to help recruit blacks for
labor gangs. Though Howard was "an exemplary nineteenth-century American," McFeely notes,
"[bjy not speaking up, Howard contributed immensely at a critical moment to the process-in the end
it defeated Reconstruction-by which the nation pulled the wool over its eyes with respect to the
freedmen." Id. at 310, 315.
108. L. LrrWACK, supra note 92, at 392, 398, notes that though the dispossessed slaveholders
thought themselves entitled to compensation, "the question of remunerating the slaves for black labor
never reached serious consideration." Litwack suggests that it is surprising that so few blacks appro-
priated what they had toiled to produce, and that "the readiness of Federal authorities to back up the
legal claims of whites to their land" helps explain the phenomenon. Id. at 212. Moreover, since the
death of slavery proved so slow, and the progress of the war in any locale so unpredictable, Litwack's
book is full of human dramas involving the independence and dependence of slaves and masters set
against the backdrop of almost unfathomable possibilities of military intervention.
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stand on their new legal rights, whites frequently responded with brutal
violence. These "dispute settlements" were sometimes reported to, but vir-
tually never controlled by, the personnel of the grossly understaffed
Freedmen's Bureau.109
After Appomattox, the former slaves had been given their freedom in
the eyes of most Americans; they were freedmen and not free men. Under
the tutelage of overburdened and often unsympathetic army officers,
blacks soon learned firsthand of the formal, binding nature of contracts.' 0
They had precious little autonomy and soon found their responsibility
under the year-long contracts they were required to sign, contracts bind-
ing them to the land until they paid off the credit advanced for seed and
supplies, to be remarkably reminiscent of slavery. Freedmen's Bureau of-
ficials, anxious to get the South back to work, often functioned as replace-
ments and functional equivalents for the overseers whose job description
had been formally eliminated by emancipation."'
Unrealistic presumptions of equal bargaining power prevailed in both
private and public legal realms. When we cast aside the doctrinal baggage
of those presumptions, however, we begin to see that the hegemony of
these presumptions may not have been inevitable. The contemporary law
of labor contracts remained distinct from the main body of contract law;
its special rules for special cases-for sailors and women, for exam-
ple"-belied appeals to a universal legal science of contracts. The domi-
nant rubric in these areas remained master-servant law, replete with a
host of accompanying paternalistic assumptions and exceptions." 3
109. See generally W. McFELY, supra note 86, at 149-65; D. NIEMAN, supra note 88, at
133-47, 177-90, 209-16.
110. See, e.g., L. LITWACK, supra note 92, at 336-86 (poignant details of chaotic post-
emancipation world and of army officers' cooperation in system of "constructive compulsion"). The
New Orleans Tribune compared the "mitigated bondage" of the "mock freedmen" to Russian serf-
dom. See id. at 377. Litwack summarizes the parallels between sharecropping and slavery as follows:
Established to ease the ex-slaves' transition to freedom, the Freedmen's Bureau ultimately
facilitated the restoration of black labor to the control of those who had previously owned
them. . . . [E]ven the best-intentioned of the commissioners and local agents manifested their
sympathy for the freedmen in curious and contradictory ways, embracing a paternalism and a
contract labor system that could only perpetuate the economic dependency of the great mass of
former slaves.
Id. at 386; see also J. JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND
THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT (1985) (black wives and mothers forced to work
outside homes for family subsistence).
111. See supra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
112. Enthusiasm for drawing clear lines between separate classes or spheres was a crucial compo-
nent in the legal culture throughout the nineteenth century, but this tendency increased in the postbel-
lum period. See supra notes 37, 101, 102, and accompanying text. The law of persons was the fount
for systematic manipulation of those categories. See, e.g., N. BASCH, supra note 40; L. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 43; Kay, The Equal Protection Clause of the Supreme Court, 1873-1903, 29 BUFFALO
L. REV. 667 (1980) (Justices assumed formal equality and invalidated "class" legislation).
113. See, e.g., T. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE NON-CONTRACT LAW chs. 31-32 (1889)
("Master and Servant"; "The Master's Duties and Liabilities to the Servant, Fellow Servants"); G.
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Many Americans decried governmental intrusion as they hastened to
put the war behind them and to resume the economic race of life. Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson's controversial February 1866 veto message con-
cerning the Freedmen's Bureau Bill illustrated a new emphasis on avoid-
ing paternalism at almost all costs, and certainly at the cost of protecting
the freedmen. Johnson claimed that the bill would discriminate against
"millions of the white race, who are honestly toiling from day to day for
their subsistence. 1 1 4 Indeed, although the President purported to support
the freedmen in "their entire independence and equality in making con-
tracts for their labor," ' 5 he adamantly rejected any role for the federal
government in guaranteeing these rights. The freedmen, according to
Johnson, had to establish and support "their own asylums and
schools."11 ' To Johnson, the race of life for former slaves was underway;
the national government had done enough already.
Johnson looked backward, in his faith in states' rights, and forward, in
his faith in economic competition without governmental regulation. Tragi-
cally, his states' rights and free market views anticipated the future more
accurately than did his congressional opponents. For a brief historical mo-
ment, however, Johnson's views did not prevail. After the Senate failed by
a single vote to override Johnson's veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill,
117
Congress succeeded in narrowly overriding Johnson's veto of a Civil
Rights Act also written by Senator Trumbull. In that April, 1866 Act,
Congress emphasized both its sense that the Thirteenth Amendment em-
powered the federal government to enforce a long list of civil rights and its
willingness to use the machinery of the federal government, including but
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 54, at 3-34; S. HOLLINGSWORTH, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 124-26, 188-94 (1896) (discussing consideration and limited notions of
duress); T. METCALF, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AS APPLIED BY COURTS OF LAW
ch. 2 (1878) (subdividing parties to contracts and emphasizing that consideration need not be ade-
quate); Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis.
L. REV. 767; Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Enterprise in the Age of American Enterprise,
1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA, 1970-1920, at 70-110
(G. Gieson ed. 1983); Hurvitz, American Labor Law and the Doctrine of Entrepreneurial Property
Rights: Boycotts, Courts, and the Juridical Reorientation of 1886-1895, 8 IND. REL. L.J. 307,
309-21 (1986); Lieber, The Supreme Court on the Military Status, 31 AM. L. REV. 342, 353 (1897).
114. See CONG. GLOBE, 39 Cong., 1st Sess. 1679-80 (1866). His message was drafted by the
historian George Bancroft and attempted to refute the broad nationalistic basis of the bill, drafted by
Senator Trumbull with the aid of General 0.0. Howard. Cox & Cox, Andrew Johnson and His
Ghost Writers: An Analysis of the Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights Veto Messages, 48 MISS.
VALLEY HIST. REV. 460, 469-73 (1961).
115. Cox & Cox, supra note 114, at 469.
116. Id. For discussion of Johnson's views generally and the powerful effect they had in pushing
Moderate Republicans into the waiting arms of Radical Republicans, see Soifer, supra note 51, at
690-96.
117. See W. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESSIONAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1867, at
106 (1963).
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not limited to the federal courts, to guarantee "full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings. 118
The nearly complete failure of this guarantee over the next cen-
tury-though the Fourteenth Amendment" removed any doubts as to its
constitutionality-typifies the American legal system's resistance to
change. Congress may have doomed the protection of equal rights it cham-
pioned in the abstract by delegating enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 to federal courts, where judges could apply their notions of scientific
contract law.'20
Perhaps the best illustration of the bankruptcy of the law's bequest to
former slaves is the uncompensated loss of their savings when the Freed-
men's Savings Bank failed soon after the Panic of 1873.21 The former
slaves had been barraged with propaganda to become self-made men by
means of saving every hard-earned penny. Now, despite repeated reassur-
ances to the contrary,122 they discovered that the federal government did
118. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982
(1982)). The Act guaranteed to
all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians
not taxed. . . the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, . . . and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.
Id.; see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1857 (1866).
119. Congress' view that the Fourteenth Amendment would eliminate any doubt about the consti-
tutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Act is one of the few points of widespread agreement in the
ongoing debate analyzing the enactment and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., R.
BERGER, GOVERMENT By JUDICIARY 99-116 (1977); H. FLACK, THE ADOPrION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 136-39, 210-77 (1908). Despite repassage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act in
haec verba in the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-1982 (1982)), there is new controversy over whether the protection of the Civil Rights Act
extends as far as its language seems to state. See 55 U.S.L.W. 3579-81 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1987) (report-
ing Supreme Court oral arguments in Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb (No. 85-2158) and Saint
Francis College v. AI-Khazraji (No. 85-2169)).
120. See, e.g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 206-07 (1864) ("We shall
never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a State tribunal has erected the altar and decreed
the sacrifice."). For a description of the expansive judicial view of federal common law jurisdiction
after the Civil War, see T. FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE: THE Swift AND Erie CASES IN
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981). As Perry Miller pointed out, lawyers and judges have long found it
convenient to proclaim a special science of the law. See P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN
AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 156-85 (1965); see also Chase, The Birth of
the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 329 (1979) (arguing that Charles Eliot, using
chemistry laboratory model, was primarily responsible for case method, not Langdell); Grey, Lang-
dell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983) (tracing classical orthodoxy in legal thought to prin-
ciples of geometry).
121. See W. FLEMING, THE FREEDMEN'S SAVINGS BANK (1927); C. OSTHAUS, FREEDMEN, PHI-
LANTHROPY, AND FRAUD: A HISTORY OF THE FREEDMEN'S SAVINGS BANK (1976). For a descrip-
tion of the general movement during the period from active governmental intervention immediately
after the war towards governmental passivity across a broad range of activities, see M. KELLER,
AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 34 (1977).
122. For an excellent account of the causes and consequences of the Freedmen's Savings Bank
failure, see C. OSTHAUS, supra note 121, at 173-225. Though he acknowledges that the Bank "had
no monopoly on ignorance, speculation, fraud, or tragedy," Osthaus makes clear that "the losses of the
Bank were among the worst of that decade-and all the more tragic because they were the first
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not stand behind the bank it set up for them. Compounding the poignancy
of the collapse was the presence of Frederick Douglass as president, a post
he had been maneuvered into just before the bank's demise. 123 But in the
immediate post-war years, Congress determined repeatedly not to leave
the former slaves alone.
Congress vastly increased federal court jurisdiction and repeatedly en-
acted federal measures to protect civil and ultimately political rights across
the nation.124 Moderates also allied with many Radicals in their desire to
keep the freedmen in the South, and to respond to the threat of increased
congressional power for the South now that blacks counted as full persons
for purposes of calculating representation. Vindictiveness towards the
South and a powerful desire to ennoble those who died by denying the
South any of the fruits of the Union victory also animated some post-war
political alliances. By 1867, Congress deemed the South unwilling or una-
ble to protect black citizens; Congress carved out five military districts and
again sent in the army.125
But daily life soon triumphed over legal promises promulgated hun-
dreds of miles away. The chaos of war and the political and legal battles
of early Reconstruction gave way to renewed faith in the purported sym-
metries of private law as the infrastructure of social order. In particular,
the legal faith of the Gilded Age rested primarily on contract law and its
formal assumptions about free will.
By 1871, federal courts were expanding their federal common law pow-
ers under a latitudinarian interpretation of Swift v. Tyson1 26 to enforce
private obligations, even if those obligations were incurred in the course of
buying and selling slaves.1 27 Thus, in the same year that Christopher Co-
savings of a recently freed people, symbolizing hopes for equal citizenship and economic security." Id.
at 200. Those losses were never repaid; the only congressional responses to numerous freedmen's
petitions "pleading that the government assume the company's assets and pay immediately the
amounts due them" were two investigations of the Bank which revealed that the Bank "had been little
more than an enormous swindle" and a few bills to reimburse the depositors, none of which led to
legislation. Id. at 208, 215-21. Compounding the tragedy was the fact that the Freedmen's Savings
Bank had constantly played upon its closeness with the Bureau and linked itself to national figures
such as Generals Grant, Sherman and Howard, and to President Lincoln in advertising and deposit
books. As Osthaus states, "the symbols of freedom had become the symbols of bank safety." Id. at 55.
Moreover, depositing their funds in the bank was a part of the payday ritual for black soldiers and for
other blacks who responded to repeated importuning that they had to be thrifty in order to get ahead.
Id. at 26-33, 87.
123. Id. at 186-98.
124. See H. Bat.z, supra note 63, at 157-77; H. HYMAN supra note 79, at 414-45; Soifer, supra
note 51, at 670-96.
125. Military Reconstruction Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428.
126. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); see T. FREYER, supra note 120, at 41-100.
127. Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654, 663 (1871) ("Whatever we may think of the
institution of slavery viewed in the light of religion, morals, humanity, or a sound political econ-
omy-as the obligation here in question was valid when executed, sitting as a court of justice, we have
no choice but to give it effect."); White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 653 (1871) ("The ideas of
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lumbus Langdell introduced the case method at Harvard and began the
quest in contracts cases for "Law, considered as a science," the Supreme
Court determined that federal common law prohibited the Louisiana leg-
islature from voiding sales contracts for slaves.12 Faith in perceived prin-
ciples of contract law was even more evident in 1875, when Justice
Swayne, writing for a unanimous Court, tried to "roll back the tide of
time, and to imagine [him]self back in Mississippi before abolition." '129
Having accomplished this feat, Swayne defeated a black man's contractual
claim to a share in the cotton crop produced on the plantation where he
toiled.130 Even accepting the truth of the former slave's account, Justice
Swayne reasoned, slaves could not contract in Mississippi at that time as a
matter of law. Accordingly, the Court held that the former slave clearly
had no legal claim. 31
This was also, of course, the ignominious period when the Court enthu-
siastically eviscerated the federal civil rights statutes," 2 effectively nulli-
validity and remedy are inseparable and both are parts of the obligation which is guaranteed by the
Constitution against invasion.").
128. This formal notion of the obligation of contracts contrasts with an earlier view that courts
should consider the morality of the underlying contract, as in Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 358,
365-66 (1810) (Sedgwick, J., dissenting). The Essex Result of 1778, for example, stated: "Thus, if a
man surrender all his alienable rights, without reserving a controul over the supreme power, or a
right to resume in certain cases, the surrender is void, for he becomes a slave; and a slave can receive
no equivalent. Common equity would set aside this bargain." THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL
AUTHORITY: DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780, at 324, 330 (0.
Handlin & M. Handlin eds. 1966). See generally P. ATiYAH, supra note 57, at 460-93, 671; M.
HoRwrrz, supra note 54, at 173-85. In the introduction to his famous casebook, Langdell stated:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have such a mas-
tery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled
skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery
should be the business of every earnest student of law. Each of these doctrines has arrived at
its present state by slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases
through centuries.
C.C. LANGDELL, LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (1871).
In this spirit of labored attention to established principles, coupled with a desire to expand federal
jurisdiction to control state legislatures, the Supreme Court in the post-Civil War years went well
beyond the holding of Swift v. Tyson in stretching diversity jurisdiction. Thus, for example, the Jus-
tices were no longer deterred if the state law they ignored in a diversity case involved state legislation
rather than a judicial declaration of the law. The Justices, probably because they so abhorred the
actions of southern reconstruction legislatures, showed no timidity in reaching to void state laws, state
constitutional provisions, and state judicial decisions that declared all contracts for the sale of slaves
against public policy and therefore no longer binding. See, e.g., Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 654 (1871) (neither Thirteenth Amendment nor section 2 of Fourteenth Amendment barring
compensation for slaves voided pre-war contract to buy slave); White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646
(1871) (new state constitution could not affect contract, even though contractual consideration was
slave).
129. Hall v. United States, 92 U.S. 27, 30 (1875).
130. The Court discussed how Hall's color was presumptive proof of his bondage, as well as the
general harshness of the law of African slavery. Id. at 28.
131. Id. at 30. The Court emphasized that if the former slave did contract with his owner, "the
contract was an utter nullity. In the view of the law, it created no obligation, and conferred no rights
as to either of the parties."
132. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (applying doctrine of the Slaugh-
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fled the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,133
and imposed a newly-minted "state action" requirement 34 to ensure that
regulation of private law matters such as contracts would be left solely to
the states. Moreover, state courts had shown increasing enthusiasm for
perceived constitutional commands of liberty of contract, and the courts
were soon joined by the Supreme Court. Judge Cooley's influential trea-
tise advocating implicit constitutional limits on federal and state govern-
ments, combined with Langdell's thrust toward legal formalism, lent re-
spectability to the judiciary's rout of civil rights1 3 5 Together, the work of
ter-House Cases to dismiss a complaint brought by two black men under § 6 of Enforcement Act for
interference with their right to vote); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (holding that §§ 3
and 4 of Enforcement Act of 1870, which provided for criminal prosecutions of officials who ob-
structed citizens from qualifying for voting, were not warranted by Fifteenth Amendment and thus
unconstitutional); see also Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877) (invalidating, on dormant commerce
clause grounds, Reconstruction-era Louisiana statute prohibiting common carriers of passengers from
discriminating on basis of race or color). See generally 2 C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND RE-
UNION, 1864-88, at 221-89 (1987) (vol. seven of Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the
United States); Waite, The Negro in the Supreme Court, 30 MINN. L. REv. 225, 230-37 (1946)
(discussing Chief Justice Waite's opinions in Reese, Cruikshank, and Hall).
133. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 37-38 (1873). Justice Miller's opinion
for a sharply-divided Court demolished the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by suggesting a basic division between state and federal citizenship that the majority considered
to be fundamentally unaltered by the post-Civil War amendments. Even Miller, however, conceded
that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments provided "additional guarantees of human rights;
additional powers to the Federal government; additional restraints upon those of the States." Id. at
67-68.
134. In The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18-19 (1883), Justice Bradley's majority opinion
held the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, unconstitutional, because it attempted to use
federal authority to guarantee "full and equal enjoyment" of public accommodations. The basis for
the Court's opinion was its view, obviously not shared by Congress or President Grant, that a federal
act goes too far when it "steps into the domain of local jurisprudence, and lays down rules for the
conduct of individuals in society towards each other, and imposes sanctions for the enforcement of
those rules, without referring in any manner to any supposed action of the State or its authority." 109
U.S. at 14. Through its failure to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1875 vigorously-part of a general
lack of will to stop the southern "revolution of 1875," W. McFEELY, GRANT 418-25 (1981)-the
federal government anticipated the Great Betrayal that resolved the 1877 presidential election and
ended Reconstruction.
Justice Bradley did note that the Thirteenth Amendment "clothes Congress with power to pass all
laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States." 109
U.S. at 20. His opinion quickly moved, however, to a classic slippery slope argument contained within
a single important sentence. Justice Bradley conflated private action with less private action and then
with decisions about access to public accommodations and to "other matters of intercourse or busi-
ness." Id. at 24-25. Bradley's crucial sentence was: "It would be running the slavery argument into
the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to
the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to
his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business." Of course, I do not
claim to have had the final word on the vexing issues of state action and the Thirteenth Amendment
in my essay reviewing Raoul Berger's book, supra note 51. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Rethinking State
Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (1985), and the response and rebuttal that follow; Dimond, Strict
Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause, 80
MICH. L. REv. 462 (1982). But readers can evaluate my argument by reading it along with Berger's
reply in Berger, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32 S.C.L. REV. 427 (1981).
135. See sources cited supra note 101; E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1934); A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE
ROLE OF LAW: ATrTUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960); Hamilton, Freedom of Con-
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federal and state courts provided a fitting culmination to the "years of
contract."
As with most culminations, however, this was also the beginning of the
end. Liberty of contract had come to dominate constitutional law in part
because legislatures had begun to challenge the exclusivity of judicial reg-
ulation of private contracts."3 6 Still, the language of clear, binary legal
categories dominated the rhetoric of treatises and appellate judges in the
last quarter of the century even more than it usually does. Judges empha-
sized that choices between liberty and paternalism were either/or matters
of principle. The reality of the sharecropper's bargaining position,
whether he was black or white, had no place in the legal categories
through which appellate judges enforced their own views about govern-
ment regulation of the natural struggle of life.
37
A kind of deep structure of belief in states' rights and state sovereignty
was an essential factor in the failure of Reconstruction.' In resorting to
contract law to establish a new status for freedmen, Congress invited
judges to exercise discretion. Through the use of hoary legal principles
about contractual autonomy, these judges returned black workers almost
to the status quo ante bellum. Ironically, as Jack Dawson demonstrated a
half-century ago, this outcome could have been avoided. Southern judges
possessed, and routinely used, tremendous discretionary power in contract
cases after the war.' 9
The Thirteenth Amendment was soon irrelevant to everything but the
most overt physical constraint.' Judges, perhaps more than most people,
tract, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 450 (1931); Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
136. See Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 455, 471 (1909); Soifer, supra note 37,
at 258-60, 274-77.
137. S. FINE, supra note 101, at 160-61; Soifer, supra note 37, at 260-74.
138. See; M. BENEDICT, supra note 74; H. HYMAN, supra note 79, at 434-41; P. PALUDAN,
supra note 14, at 49-54; see also R. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
(1985); S. KtrTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS (1968).
139. In 1934 and 1935, John P. Dawson wrote or co-authored four articles in Volume 33 of the
Michigan Law Review dealing with the problems of inflation and currency regulation. Dawson's
work, which has generally been overlooked by historians, is a treasure-trove of information and of
provocative insight. The article most relevant to the present discussion, written with Frank E. Cooper,
is The Effect of Inflation on Private Contracts: United States, 1861-1879 (pts. 1 & 2), 33 MICH. L.
REV. 706, 852 (1935) ("Confederate Cases" and "Northern Cases," respectively). Charles Fairman
provides incomparable detail on the struggle between state and federal courts over the related, largely
successful effort of southern states to avoid enforcement of bond obligations in 1 C. FAIRMAN, supra
note 132. For an excellent recent study of the successful use of the Eleventh Amendment by the
Southern states (except Virginia) to evade their bond obligations, see J. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER
OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987).
140. In Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905), for example, Justice Brewer's majority
opinion invalidated one of the rare successful peonage prosecutions, the conviction by a jury of a
brutal white overseer in the south Georgia and Florida turpentine farms. Brewer emphasized that
debt was the necessary "basal" condition of compulsory service and therefore held that, since no peon
was indebted to the master, the case should not have gone to the jury. Id. at 215. For the factual
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value order. In the very act of judging, they are supposed to be informed
by their perceptions of what has come before.141 Thus, although the Civil
War unquestionably remade the political and constitutional world, judges
took comfort in antebellum precedents and proclaimed their dedication to
orderly development of the law. They would make no radical exceptions.
Admittedly, gang labor was generally eliminated and, at least for a time,
many black women could choose not to work in the fields. But the
postbellum status and working conditions of the black sharecropper or
field hand often were no better, and sometimes were worse, than his place
within the peculiar institution.1 42 He was a free man contracting for his
services, but only within a web of legal doctrines that forbade plantation
owners to "entice" someone else's laborer, and criminal fraud statutes that
promised prison and a chain gang, or the convict-lease system, if he tried
to escape his contract. Moreover, the constant threat of extralegal enforce-
ment assured that the former slave remained both on and in his place.
By 1883, the Supreme Court had determined in the Civil Rights Cases
that:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he
takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite
143of the laws ....
context of the case, see P. DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH,
1901-1969, at 3-18 (1972).
141. JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 1, at 7 ("Judges, more than most men, are conscious of the
baggage of the past.").
142. See P. DANIEL, supra note 140, at 1-42; D. NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK
FORCED LABOR AFTER SLAVERY (1978). Both books contain dramatic accounts of the exceptional
judges who departed from the norm and condemned the peonage system. Apparently, there was a
wave of such decisions just after the turn of the century. This phenomenon resists easy explanation. It
may be directly connected to the political transformation of the South during that period, with Repub-
lican judges resisting Democratic Party domination. See J. KouSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN
POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH,
1880-1910 (1974). Booker T. Washington's secret role in financing and plotting litigation strategy is
described in P. DANIEL, supra note 140, at 65-81. In addition, the muckrakers and the Progressive
movement provided some generalized impetus, despite discouragement from the Supreme Court. See
Soifer, supra note 50, at 383, 397-98; see also United States v. Morris, 125 F. 122, 125 (D. Ark.
1903) ("Shall the Courts be less liberal in construing provisions in favor of freedom than those in
favor of slavery?"); A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT,
1910-1921, at 820-907 (1984); (vol. nine of Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the
United States). But see Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of
Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (1986) (critical view of celebratory tone of Bickel &
Schmidt).
143. 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). A disturbing echo of this argument by Justice Bradley occurred in
Justice Powell's decisive opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
295 (1978), where Powell asserted, "It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection
to all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than
that accorded others."
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Following the conservative redemption of the South and accompanying the
rise of virulent racism in the Jim Crow era,""' the Supreme Court re-
treated to a position of almost complete deference to whatever results
politics or the market might yield.
Justice Holmes, for example, in one of his first majority opinions on
the Supreme Court, concentrated on the enforcement problems if there
were federal court review of disfranchisement claims.14 Because the
blacks of Alabama alleged that "the great mass of the white population
intends to keep the blacks from voting," Holmes wrote, the courts could
provide no remedy unless they were "prepared to supervise the voting in
that State by officers of the court. 1 46 Therefore, the blacks were told that
they should seek relief for "a great political wrong, if done," from the
people of Alabama or from "the legislative and political department of the
government of the United States."'4 7
Two years after Holmes's opinion, and forty years after slavery's end,
the Supreme Court determined in Hodges v. United States148 that "when
the problem of the emancipated slaves was before the Nation," the nation
"declined to constitute them wards of the Nation or leave them in a condi-
tion of alienage where they would be subject to the jurisdiction of Con-
gress."'149 Instead, as Justice Brewer explained for the majority, the eman-
cipated slaves were given citizenship because the Nation "doubtless
believ[ed] that thereby in the long run their best interests would be sub-
served, they taking their chances with other citizens in the States where
they should make their homes."' 50
When courts impose sentences of death or imprisonment, they deal with
pain and suffering. But they are also jurispathic, as Bob Cover empha-
sized, when they settle normative contests. 5 ' And judges are hardly less
jurispathic when they deny jurisdiction to just claims that demand to be
heard. Forty years after slavery, instead of their promised land, blacks
found themselves instructed to "tak[e] their chances" and thereby to hope
for their best interests "in the long run." Judicial inaction, judicial failure
to listen, also deals pain and death. Judges thereby commit themselves "to
144. J. WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE, supra note 93, at 109-223.
145. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
146. Id. at 488.
147. Id.; see also Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (1904) (suit filed by blacks disfranchised by
1901 Virginia constitution dismissed as moot since election for federal House of Representatives al-
ready held); Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 (1904) (Court "not unmindful of gravity of charges
against state," but since Supreme Court of Alabama held state law left qualifications for voter regis-
tration to board of registrars in judicial capacity, independent state law ground barred review by
United States Supreme Court).
148. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
149. Id. at 20; see supra note 140 (discussing Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905)).
150. 203 U.S. at 20.
151. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 3, at 53-60.
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survival of hierarchical authority first, and interpretive integrity or justice
only secondarily. '152 More gloomily still, the history I have related recalls
Bob Cover's words: "History corrects for the scale of heroics that we
would otherwise project upon the past. ' 153 But Bob went on to suggest
hope as well as painful remembrance: "Only myth tells us who we would
become; only history can tell us how hard it will really be to become
that.11 5 4 With new narratives, in other words, it might be possible to ad-
vance beyond the grand declarations of universal freedom that yielded
only distant hope and bitter blues. We might do better than merely to
reinstate competition of each against each and all against all according to
the established rules of the game.
III. BILLY BUDD: MATTERS 'NOT So SUSCEPTIBLE OF PROOF'
In Billy Budd, Herman Melville brilliantly dissects the pathology of
judging; he also offers a strikingly apt, though at least double-edged, chal-
lenge to retrospective moral judgment. He succeeds in enticing his readers
to identify directly with and yet to judge the characters in his story. After
Captain Vere successfully bullies his drumhead court to convict Billy
Budd and to order his execution,1 55 however, the narrator's flat voice re-
turns, claiming not to render judgment but only to recall a similar event,
the Somers mutiny incident in 1842. Melville's cousin presided over the
court aboard the Somers and voted to convict and to execute a midship-
man and two sailors in time of peace, not many days' sail from
home-and we are told that even under those circumstances a naval court
of inquiry on shore vindicated the decision to hang the alleged muti-
neers. 1 56 The narrator then adds the sardonic and cryptic observation:
"History, and here cited without comment."
1 57
152. Id. at 58.
153. Cover, Folktales of Justice, supra note 3, at 190.
154. Id.
155. After proclaiming that their loyalty is to the King, and not to Nature, by virtue of "these
buttons that we wear," Vere tells the drumhead court:
But let not warm hearts betray heads that should be cool. Ashore in a criminal case, will an
upright judge allow himself off the bench to be waylaid by some tender kinswoman of the
accused seeking to touch him with her tearful plea? Well, the heart here, sometimes the femi-
nine in man, is as that piteous woman, and hard though it be, she must here be ruled out.
BILLY BUDD, supra note 39, at 362. This dichotomous view of head and heart, male and female, is
familiar in law, of course, and often used to explain the role of equity mitigating the masculine vigor
of law. See, e.g., K. NEWMYER, supra note 40, at 291, quoting Story to exactly this effect. Vere
advises the members of the court that their choice is binary: "We must do; and one of two things must
we do, condemn or let go." BILLY BUDD, supra note 39, at 363.
156. BILLY BUDD, supra note 39, at 365. For a provocative discussion of Melville and his family,
and of the Somers incident (which gained considerable notoriety in part because one of those executed
was the son of the Secretary of the Navy), see M. RoGIN, SUBVERSIVE GENEALOGY: THE POLITICS
AND ART OF HERMAN MELVILLE (1983).
157. BILLY BUDD, supra note 39, at 365.
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Early in Billy Budd, however, Melville emphasizes how history sani-
tizes events. Throughout his work, Melville contrasts the "ragged edges"
of "truth uncompromisingly told" with the misleading "symmetry of
form" one finds in "fable" and "pure fiction." ' Thus, Melville's reliance
on history "without comment" compounds the irony. Melville further em-
phasizes the ironic problem of retrospective judgment when the narrator
next suggests a defense of Vere's verdict by proposing a formal principle,
justified paradoxically by a fable. After Vere authorizes yet another "vari-
ance from usage' '1 59 in his haste to have Billy Budd hanged, the narrator
explains that this might be interpreted as evidence of the necessity for
unusual action: "'With mankind,' [as Vere] would say, 'forms, measured
forms, are everything; and this is the import couched in the story of Or-
pheus with his lyre spellbinding the wild denizens of the wood.' "O
Though he underscores the difficulty of judging, Melville repeatedly com-
pels the reader to make judgments and warns of the danger inherent in
failure to judge.
Billy Budd rivets attention on a conflict: Captain Vere's obedience to
formal rules and to his perceived duty contrasts sharply with the demands
of actual justice. As Bob Cover wrote, Melville is "astonishingly successful
in making his readers ask dreadful questions of Vere and his behavior."18
Bob forcefully extended this cross-examination to judges who opt for sta-
bility over the claims of natural rights. And, as Bob put it, "in portraying
a man caught in the horrible conflict between duty and conscience, be-
tween role and morality, between nature and positive law," it would be
158. Billy Budd is "[a]n inside narrative" whose power derives from its being "spare, spectral,
dualistic, historical fiction. . . [which] anticipates the Kafkaesque strand of literary modernism." M.
RoGIN, supra note 156, at 296. Melville's approach here is related, I think, to his repeated theme
that history does not capture the bleakness of what actually occurred. For example, he wrote with
irony of the Great Mutiny of 1797, which established the context for the removal of the Handsome
Sailor from the Rights of Man to the Bellipotent: "Such events cannot be ignored, but there is a
considerate way of historically treating them. If a well-constituted individual refrains from blazoning
aught amiss or calamitous in his family, a nation in the like circumstance may without reproach be
equally discreet." BILLY BUDD, supra note 39, at 304.
159. BILLY BUDD, supra note 39, at 380. The paradoxical relationship of "measured forms" and
this "variance from usage" echoes a number of other references to "strict adherence to usage," id. at
369, in contrast to departures from "usage" in Vere's rush to judgment. For a detailed argument that
Melville sought to underscore the legal impropriety of Vere's actions, see R. WEISBERG, THE FAIL-
URE OF THE WORD 160-176 (1984).
160. BILLY BUDD, supra note 39, at 380. The narrator has just said:
Says a writer whom few know, "forty years after a battle it is easy for a noncombatant to
reason about how it ought to have been fought. It is another thing personally and under fire to
have to direct the fighting while involved in the obscuring smoke of it. Much so with respect to
other emergencies involving considerations both practical and moral, and when it is imperative
promptly to act. . . . Little ween the snug card players in the cabin of the responsibilities of
the sleepless man on the bridge."
161. JUsTICE ACCUSED, supra note 1, at 4.
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remarkable if Melville had been "untouched by the figure of his father-in-
law," '162 Lemuel Shaw, confronting actual slavery cases.
Inspired by what Bob Cover had to say about Shaw and other judges, I
suggest that Herman Melville forces us to confront dreadful questions
about our own detached obedience to law, our suppositions about individ-
ual autonomy, and ourselves. From this perspective, the minor character
of the navy surgeon may be at the core of the story. Through the surgeon,
Melville asks prescient questions, questions about cynicism and compla-
cency in a world in which truth seems impossible to identify.
A century after Melville wrote Billy Budd, and forty years after the
Holocaust, it is the surgeon who most powerfully poses the dreadful ques-
tions we face about insight, obedience, and complicity.16 In all of us,
though perhaps particularly in lawyers, there is some of Vere, some
staunch unwillingness to deviate from settled forms. Yet we are probably
more directly implicated in the innocent bystander, the Bellipotent's sur-
geon, than in Vere or Billy Budd. Few become captains or judges, but we
all confront what the surgeon faced. Through him, we may recognize that
truth is often elusive and that our unwillingness to fight for our best
guesses about truth tends to produce anomie or, even worse, collaboration
with evil.
The surgeon considers Vere's drumhead court at best "impolitic.
1 64
He believes that in an extraordinary case such as that of Billy Budd, it
certainly would accord with (and may even be dictated by) "usage" for
Captain Vere to rejoin the squadron and refer the matter to the admi-
ral."'65 Not only is the surgeon "full of disquietude and misgiving," but he
begins to think that Vere, the embodiment of authority on the ship, actu-
ally may be "unhinged."' 66 Unfortunately, the surgeon also knows that
this suspicion is "not so susceptible of proof."11 7 Melville underscores the
162. Id. at 5.
163. In the first piece he published in a law review as an Assistant Professor-Designate, Bob
Cover used his rediscovery of R. HILDRETH, ATRocious JUDGES: LivEs OF JUDGES-INFAMOUS AS
TOOLS OF TYRANTS AND INSTRUMENTS OF OPPRESSION (1856) to comment on the Vietnam war and
on the role of judges facing legal challenges "to the smooth functioning of the war machine." Cover,
Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1003, 1006 (1968). He wrote with vigor and some harshness about
the role of federal judges in the past, and he made explicit the connection between his intention to
hold a mirror up to judges to show them that they are implicated in moral outrages perpetrated
through legal process and his view that "the brutal lessons of Hitler and Stalin" ought to make judges
"wary of making secular law ...the only standard for human conduct." Id. at 1005. Bob pro-
claimed: "With Nazi Germany fresh in our minds, with the screaming silence of the German people
barely passed into history, the silence and, more, the cooperation of the federal bench demands com-
ment." Id. at 1006. In a sense, my concern is on a less specific, perhaps more democratic level than
Bob's repeated examination of the interrelationship of rules and rulers. I seek to ask Coveresque
questions about all the rest of us.
164. BILLY BuDD, supra note 39, at 352.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. This recalls the narrator's earlier discussion of an anonymous person called "an honest
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surgeon's dilemma about whether to act on his insight: "No more trying
situation is conceivable," than that of a person who believes his com-
mander is not entirely mad, "but yet not unaffected in his intelligence." '
Caught between choosing insolence or mutiny, the surgeon simply follows
orders.
The next paragraph begins with a striking meditation on truth. Mel-
ville has the surgeon ponder: "Who in the rainbow can draw the line
where the violet ends and the orange begins? Distinctly we see the differ-
ence of the colors, but where exactly does the one first blendingly enter
into the other?"169 Here, indeterminancy is applied specifically to issues
of sanity and insanity, but the narrator notes sardonically that "[t]here is
nothing nameable but that some men will, or undertake to, do it for
pay. °70 In the next paragraph, Melville tells his readers that "every one
must determine for himself"171 whether Vere was the victim of any degree
of aberration.
Melville's theme of the imperceptible degrees of truth, and the way in
which professional training may blind even someone as perceptive as the
surgeon, is presented more acutely near the end of Billy Budd. Chapter
Twenty-six, a curious interruption of the flow of the story's denouement,
describes an exchange between the surgeon and the purser concerning the
motionlessness of Billy Budd's body at the moment he was hanged. The
scholar." Id. at 324. The scholar insists that he is an adherent of no organized religion and certainly
not of any philosophical system, and he denigrates the use of "what is known as 'knowledge of the
world'" to "enter [someone's] labyrinth and get out again." Coke and Blackstone are even sillier
examples of what may be taken to be knowledge, the scholar adds, since they "hardly shed so much
light as the Hebrew prophets." And he points out that the prophets were "[m]ostly recluses." Id. at
325.
168. Id. at 353. Here Melville may have been intentionally providing a variation on a theme from
R. DANA, Two YEARS BEFORE THE MAST: A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF THE SEA (1840) Richard
Henry Dana, Jr. expresses revulsion about a shipboard flogging, yet notes "If a sailor resist his
commander, he resists the law, and piracy or submission are his only alternatives." Id. at 95-96. For
a fine comparative treatment of Dana and Melville, see R. Ferguson, supra note 13, at 263-72.
Ferguson argues that the movement of nineteenth-century American literature generally was "toward
an increasingly personal stance and away from social affirmations, toward what Herman Melville
would call the capacity to say 'NO! in thunder.'" Id. at 58 (quoting letter from H. Melville to N.
Hawthorne (Apr. 16, 1851) in The Portable Melville 423 (J. Leyda ed. 1952)).
169. Id. The error in the ordering of the colors in the spectrum may make a further point about
what we see and what we know. In another famous passage, Melville says: "In this world of lies,
truth is forced to fly like a scared white doe in the woodlands; and only by glimpses will she reveal
herself, as in Shakespeare and other masters of the great Art of telling the truth even though it be
covertly and by snatches." H. MELVILLE, Hawthorne and His Mosses, in THE PORTABLE MELVILLE
400, 408 (J. Leyda ed. 1952).
170. BILLY BUDD, supra note 39, at 353. Elsewhere, Melville compares Claggart's approach to
Billy Budd to "the measured step and calm collected air of an asylum physician." Id. at 349. Melville
may have been particularly attuned to the difficulties of distinguishing sanity and insanity in a de-
tached way because his own family had worried about his sanity in the early 1850's and even ar-
ranged for a consultation, apparently with Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes. See H. MELVILLE: SELECTED
TALES AND POEMS at vii (R. Chase ed. 1950); M. ROGIN, supra note 156, at 186.
171. BILLY BUDD, supra note 39, at 353. Thus, Melville emphasizes the difficulty of judging yet
tells us that we must be active readers.
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purser, "more accurate as an accountant than profound as a philosopher,"
believes this "singularity" a remarkable testament to will power."7 2 But
the surgeon, described here as "one in whom a discreet causticity went
along with a manner less genial than polite," explains that the normal
movement at a death by hanging results merely from a mechanical spasm,
and is "no more attributable to will power . . . than to horsepower."" 3
The surgeon ultimately must concede that the absence of spasmodic move-
ment was "phenomenal," but he takes this to mean only that "it was an
appearance the cause of which is not immediately to be assigned."'1 74 Once
the surgeon categorizes a problem as "imaginative and metaphysical-in
short, Greek,"' 1 5 he assumes that his ability to pigeonhole has achieved
the proper limit for his engagement. The surgeon abruptly changes tone,
we are told, using the ironic excuse that he has a case in sick bay "that I
do not care to leave to my assistants."117 6 Melville concludes the digression
in this chapter with what seems, at a minimum, a significant double pun
concerning the surgeon: "And rising from the mess he formally
withdrew."'
77
We know the surgeon is aware of indeterminacy. This makes his for-
mal withdrawal from "the mess" and from personal judgment, excused
with a claim of professional commitment, even more apt and more prob-
lematic for us than Vere's decision to resolve the "jugglery of circum-
stances" according to his "vows of allegiance to martial duty," rather than
on "a primitive basis."'7 8 Similarly, the challenge in Betty's Case, as in
the moral-formal dilemmas that Bob Cover considered throughout his
work, is to decide when to confront rules and when to accept them, when
to leave people alone and when to intervene. It is not only captains and
judges who must decide when to challenge the ordinary rules of orderly
conduct. Bob Cover and Herman Melville powerfully delineate the juris-
dictional lines that may sometimes contain force, but that also tend to
confine justice. The surgeon, like us, knows that much is unknowable and
more is "not so susceptible of proof." His plight and his retreat into for-
malism and duty speak to us, and to our possibilities and limitations in
thinking with skeptical realism about law.
172. Id. at 376.
173. Id.




178. Id. at 354. Robert Ferguson argues that Melville borrowed heavily from the professional
orthodoxy popularized by Langdell, Holmes, and others in the second half of the nineteenth century
in presenting Vere's opinions. Ferguson states: "Unmistakably, it is precision of language, and exclud-
ing logic, insistence upon context, and an overruling distrust of moral philosophy--traits of the mod-
em professional-that kill Billy Budd." R. Ferguson, supra note 13, at 289.
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IV. CONCLUSION
I have told a bleak story, one that highlights the irony and the danger
of leaving tough issues of paternalism and autonomy to captains and
judges. I have no panacea, no grand normative premise to help them or us
sort out the conundrum.
Yet it is worth remembering that Bob Cover never lost hope, not even
for law. He never stopped believing that "legal meaning is a challenging
enrichment of social life, a potential restraint on arbitrary power and vio-
lence." 179 I think that the Second Reconstruction after a century of tragic
delay, and Bob's own involvement in it,180 helps explain his optimism in
the face of the sobering complexity he helped us see in legal history. He
urged that we keep on telling and creating heroic tales-what Bob cele-
brated as sacred narratives of jurisdiction and as myths of constitutional
constraint and entitlement. I think that Bob saw constitutionalism as
mythic and, therefore, as incredibly worthwhile. Bob was iconoclastic, not
nihilistic. He emphasized that law matters in specific decisions."' 1 He also
passionately sought to rethink and to use law "to invite new worlds.""8 2
I do not know if Bob remembered how Carl Becker once described his-
torians. I always meant to give these words to Bob, but I assumed that
there would be time enough, even for someone of my absent-minded,
procrastinating ways. Becker's words fit Bob Cover and would have
amused him. Becker said historians are part of "that ancient and honora-
ble company of wise-men of the tribe, of bards and story-tellers and min-
strels, of soothsayers and priests, to whom in successive ages has been
entrusted the keeping of useful myths."18"
Biblical narratives provide the paradigm for narratives that bind and
educate. It is surely no coincidence that Bob knew and continued to study
Bible and Talmud. He delighted in discovering rebellious elders, second
sons who inherited despite the clear rules that provided only for the eldest,
rabbis in Safed who argued with Jerusalem about reinstating the rabbinic
179. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 3, at 68.
180. Bob often referred to law as a bridge, perhaps the only bridge from the limitations we learn
from the past and the promising possibilities we can pursue for the future. Cover, Folktales ofJustice,
supra note 3, at 181; Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 3, at 9. This hope may help explain
his decision as an undergraduate to give up a fellowship to study Chinese in order to work in the civil
rights movement in Georgia, where he spent several weeks in jail for acting on his beliefs. It is also
probably related to the unusual decision by a great abstract thinker, as Bob unquestionably was, to
relocate his office to the chaotic and nitty-gritty world of the Yale Legal Services Organization. Bob
wanted to be in the middle of the tumult there, to be available to help with the minutiae of civil
procedure, for example, because he believed deeply that lawyering for the right causes is not just
admirable, it is vitally important to seeking justice.
181. See, e.g., JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 1, at 81-82.
182. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 3, at 68.
183. See C. BECKER, EVERY MAN His OWN HISTORIAN: ESSAYS ON HISTORY AND PoLrsCS
231 (1935).
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line, and other examples of people who knew when to make exceptions to
rules, without losing sight of the importance of rules themselves.
The Bible tells us that it took the Israelites forty years to reach the
promised land. They were not the same people who escaped from Egypt,
and the promised land proved to be anything but Eden. There are many
interpretations of the Exodus and of the repeated murmurings of the peo-
ple in the desert. I prefer an interpretation of the forty years of wandering
that urges us to strive for freedom in a better world, despite the repeated
setbacks our own limitations as well as arbitrary powers may impose.
Maimonides explained that the Lord "used a gracious ruse in causing [the
people] to wander perplexedly in the desert until their souls became cou-
rageous . . and until, moreover, people were born who were not accus-
tomed to humiliation and servitude."1's Viewing the years of wandering
in the wilderness as a "new school for the soul"'18 5 underscores the impor-
tance of knowing, and transcending, the past.
Bob Cover taught and demonstrated that "A great speaker or writer of
the language ordinarily acts according to the rules but knows when and
how to ignore them as well."18' 6 He celebrated prophets more than priests.
Bob gave us hope for legal progress and help in recognizing the narrative
claims of those squeezed into near silence by our ambivalence about the
contest between legal rights and legal power.
Bob Cover's example inspires us to keep marching through the wilder-
ness. And we all must decide which narratives from the past to condemn
and which to honor. Ancient tales will accompany our march, and so will
the rhythms and new stories of different drummers.
184. M. WALZER, supra note 48, at 54 (quoting M. MAIMONIDES, THE GUIDE FOR THE PER-
PLEXED 1:526-28 (3.32.70a and b).
185. Id. at 43 (elaborating upon Anthony Hecht's poem Exile).
186. JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 1, at 127.
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